The Long Fuse

At Pearl Harbor 6 1/2 years ago, the provocation was simple, swift and beyond recall: Japanese bombs hit U.S. battleships in a matter of seconds. In Berlin last week provocation had a longer fuse. By blocking the normal food supply of some 2,500,000 people in Berlin's western zones (see col. 2), the Russians were betting that they could force the Western Allies out in a matter of days or weeks.

Did it mean war between the U.S. and Russia? Only the Russians knew the answer to that question; Americans profoundly hoped not. There were three possible alternatives, short of war:

The West could abandon Berlin. If so, it would surrender the most critical outpost in Europe, and the Russians would organize another satellite state. Even more important, hesitant millions of Europeans would be treated to the spectacle of the great Western powers backing down in the face of naked Soviet force. Austrians, Italians, Turks, and Swedes--among others --would draw their reluctant conclusions.

There were other choices. In Warsaw last week, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov (who was in high good humor) pointed out one. At the end of his brisk three-day session with satellite diplomats, he issued a "new" offer to the West which, in gist, proposed that all four occupying powers get out of Berlin --set up a "democratic" German government for all of Germany, and withdraw their troops. (The Warsaw communique added, however, that Russia would still want a hand in running the Ruhr.) This alternative had considerable attractions for the Kremlin: they had experience in setting up governments like that. And getting Allied troops out would be a definite step in the greater plan--taking over Germany.

Last week the U.S. and Britain were following a third course. There was no name for it yet, but it meant standing fast. When the Russians shut off food trains, the U.S. flew in what supplies it could. Standing fast could also mean arming Western food trains and leaving the Russians the choice of stopping them or not. In a speech at week's end, Winston Churchill said: "It is our heart's desire that peace may be preserved, but we should by now have learned that there is no safety in yielding to dictators, whether Nazi or Communist."

Churchill, who had been right about one Munich, did not want another. Said he: "The only hope of peace is to be strong, to act with other great freedom-loving nations, and to make it plain to the aggressor, while time remains, that we should bring the world against him, and defend ourselves and our cause by every means should he strike the felon's blow. I cannot guarantee that even a firm and resolute course will ward off the dangers . . . but I am sure that such a course is not merely the best but the only chance of preventing a third war . . ."

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