To Make the Desert Bloom

The President's "bold new program" (see col. I) caught nearly everyone by surprise. Pravda's first reaction was a noncommittal two paragraphs on the inaugural; Henry Wallace called the whole speech almost "a declaration of war." Most foreign observers were delighted; most U.S. Congressmen were confused.

In Washington no one seemed to know exactly what the President had in mind. How much would it cost? Who would foot the bill? Maybe it wasn't another offer of a bottle of milk to every Hottentot, but it sounded as if the U.S. proposed to tell the Hottentots how to run a dairy.

Actually there seemed to be no solid answers to any of these questions. Truman hadn't drawn up any detailed blueprints for his "bold new program," or estimated the costs. Explained a White House adviser "The President was merely convinced that the idea was sound, just as President Roosevelt, before detailed plans were prepared, was convinced that we could produce 50,000 tanks and 60 million jobs." In other words, it was more than a feeler, but not yet a program.

Added another White House aide: "Say a country requests technical aid from the United States to lift its standard of living.

The Jordan River Valley in Palestine, where the desert could be made to bloom, might be a good example. A survey would be made, a plan outlined, and then industry, agriculture and labor would be put to work to bring the plan about."

It was, in fact, not a scheme to spend money, but to save money. Explained the aide: "The whole point of the plan is enlightened self-interest. We don't want to go on forever handing out doles. The Marshall Plan gets them over the hump, but it will be the great, imponderable strength of our technical skills, combined with their manpower and resources that will help these countries out."

The day after his inauguration, Harry Truman added his own explanation of what the program was driving at. It was more than a shiny offering in democracy's worldwide competition with the alluring promises of Communism.

There was something in it for the U.S. too: an increase of only 1% or 2% in the standard of living in Asia, he said, would produce a demand for U.S. exports that could not be satisfied for 100 years.

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