What the U.S. Wants

Nobody could say last week that the U.S. did not know what it wanted. At least as far as Western Europe was concerned, the U.S. objective was clear. It was "integration." Some Europeans have professed not to know what the U.S. means by integration; others suggest that the U.S. itself does not know what it means. In recent weeks, ECAdministrator Paul Hoffman, integration's foremost prophet and promoter, as well as other EGA officials, has made its meaning perfectly plain.

Long-Range. As EGA sees it, economic integration includes two sets of objectives, one long-range, one shortrange.

The long-range objective is simply the fusion of Western Europe's separate, relatively autarchic economies into one large, American-style free trading area. Only such a single market (with an estimated 270 million customers) could sustain efficient mass production in Western Europe; it would also force Western Europe's flabby protectionist capitalism into a new, competitive way of life.

EGA realizes that this objective is not merely an economic proposition, but that it will take a large measure of political union as well. EGA also realizes that the objective cannot be reached in a few years, and certainly not by 1952, when Marshall Plan aid to Europe ends. But EGA believes that nothing short of full economic integration can boost Western Europe's industrial output enough to end its dependence on the U.S.

Short-Range. The short-range objectives are supposed to establish sane and honest conditions for freer trade in Western Europe as soon as possible, and to prod its industry into more competition and greater efficiency. The U.S. Congress will expect to be shown considerable progress toward these objectives when it considers iQSo's EGA appropriations early next year. The objectives are:

1) Progressive abolition of quantitive restrictions on Western European trade, i.e., import quotas (the OEEC nations have promised to do away with import quotas on 50% of their private trade).

2) Substantial improvement in the intra-European payments scheme to make convertibility of currency easier, i.e., to make the pound, the franc, and other national currencies eventually equally acceptable anywhere within Europe.

3) Abolition of "double pricing," i.e., the practice now common in many Western European countries of selling commodities at low prices at'home, while selling them abroad for all the traffic will bear.

4) Making OEEC, now mainly an advisory body, ECA's chosen instrument of integration, with clear responsibilities and enough political weight to compel member nations to abide by its decisions. One important step toward this goal: appointment of a strong OEEC secretary (possible candidates: Britain's Sir Oliver Franks, now ambassador to the U.S., and Belgium's Paul-Henri Spaak, first President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe).

A middle stage between the short-range and long-range objectives would be regional groupings, like the proposed monetary and customs union among Benelux, France, Italy and, eventually, Western Germany.

In & Out. Among the major obstacles facing both the long-range and short-range objectives is Britain. Sir Stafford Cripps has said flatly that Britain cannot integrate her economy with Western Europe's because of her obligations to the Commonwealth and to the sterling area. Actually, many an EGA official believes that the real reason for Britain's aloofness is the fact that Crippsian Socialists do not want British industry to be exposed to the contamination of a free competitive market. The British denounce such free-enterprising Marshall Plan countries as Belgium and Italy as "irresponsible"--as if, said one exasperated EGA official last week, Britain and not the U.S. were providing Marshall Plan funds. Added the official: "It is true that the U.S. must learn to behave like a creditor nation, but it is going to take even longer for the British to learn to behave like a debtor nation."

EGA realizes that Britain retains enough power and prestige on the Continent to wreck integration simply by refusing to take part in it. The French, for instance, are unwilling to throw their industry into free competition with Germany's, without having British industry acting as a balance to check the tremendous German competitive potential. But EGA has accepted British reservations, and hopes that, by an almost metaphysical formula, the British can be both in & out, i.e., not participate in European integration and yet still lead the movement toward it. Just how that trick could be turned was not clear. But despite such vague spots, integration represented the boldest and most positive approach to Western Europe's economic problem which the U.S. had yet devised. It also included the beginnings of a bold, unified Western policy to bring Germany into the community of Western nations (see FOREIGN NEWS).

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.