THE U.S. TRAGEDY IN FORMOSA

John Osborne, TIME-LiFE senior correspondent in the Far East, visited the Formosan capital of Taipei last week, cabled:

THIS capital teems with testaments to the tragic miscalculations and near-fatal results of U.S. policy toward the Chinese Nationalists and Formosa. The visible, jarring fact is that the U.S. has created a situation which now makes it well-nigh impossible to sustain any effective position whatever on and toward Formosa. If the miscalculations of the State Department are retrieved, it will be only because Formosa's Nationalists, in their extremity, are able and willing to make retrieval possible.

The full import of the U.S. State Department's attitude toward the Chinese Nationalists in recent months is measurable only in terms of the Nationalists' political position on Formosa. If this position was understood by the State Department, the State Department stands convicted of the deliberate sabotage of the Chinese government; if this position was not understood, the State Department stands convicted of avoidable ignorance.

Blind & Stubborn. On Formosa, as in every other part of Asia, U.S. pronouncements are read with extraordinary attention ; they eventually reach even the illiterate masses. And the State Department has blindly and stubbornly insisted on the maximum distribution of official American statements that were bound to undermine the Formosans' confidence in their government. On more than one occasion, Formosa's Nationalists have sharply and justifiably reminded the puny U.S. representation here that the statements of Secretary of State Dean Acheson and other Washington spokesmen constituted a direct attack on a government which was, after all, host to the very Americans in charge of disseminating these statements throughout Formosa. .

The results of this almost incredible situation have not been catastrophic for two reasons: 1) Chiang Kai-shek's present government is definitely better in performance and public relations than any Chinese Nationalist government since the mid-1950s; 2) a bumper rice crop this year has made rural Formosans feel pretty good and allayed discontent that might otherwise have been stimulated by American statements.

Crowning Irony. The crowning irony came this week when Nationalist Spokesman Shen Chang-huan felt constrained to dispel at least part of the heavy fog surrounding President Truman's statement on Formosa. Said Shen in a statement to the Chinese press: "I believe the U.S. has no territorial ambitions on Formosa." It was a statement that any local U.S. spokesman might have been expected to make, but of course none did. Any local U.S. diplomat who said anything reassuring to the Chinese government would have expected to lose his job.

It makes no sense for the U.S. to reverse its concept of Formosa's strategic importance and at the same time cling stubbornly to the old, down-the-nose political attitude towards Formosa's Nationalist government. Yet so far as I can judge here, this is precisely what the U.S. State Department is undertaking to do. I can state as fact that no instructions to modify or alter in any way our political, diplomatic and military relations with the government of this island have been received by U.S. representatives here.

The prevailing American attitude is that any help to Formosa, military or economic (beyond the present ECA program), would be a mistake because it would build up the Nationalist government, again identify the U.S. Government with it, and thereby contribute to the Nationalist return to the mainland so ardently opposed by our State Department.

All here, including the responsible Chinese I have so far seen, realize that this is no time to rake up the past for recriminations' sake. But all here also realize that this past has created problems to be dealt with now--and to be dealt with by U.S. officials whose attitudes and capacities, for the most part, can only be measured by the recent past.

Close Call. Consider the U.S. position on Formosa after Truman's statement: the senior U.S. representative was Consul General and Charge d'Affaires Robert Strong, a State Department career man of modest reputation. The senior military representative was an Army lieutenant colonel assisted by a staff of three other officers and barely enough enlisted men to answer phones, drive staff cars. Not one of the military men had the rank or authority to provide the liaison so urgently required with the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

Last week an incident symbolized the lack of contact between U.S. officials here and the Nationalist government.

Six U.S. planes appeared over Formosa's west coast. They were reported as strange aircraft because the Nationalists had not been informed that they were coming. Nationalist fighters took off to intercept them. A moment before they would have opened fire, they recognized the U.S. markings on the planes. At Tainan, where the American planes came in to land, Nationalist ack-ack crews learned only at the last minute, and then from their own pilots, that the "strange" planes were American. Had the identification come a few seconds later, the crews would have fired on the U.S. planes.

Most responsible Chinese here are fully aware that Washington and the Seventh Fleet have a war on their hands and other things than Formosa to think about. Nevertheless, they have reasonably requested clarification here and in Washington of Truman's rather cryptic cease-fire orders to Chinese forces, and with notable patience and forbearance have tried to learn what is expected of them by the Seventh Fleet.

Just Relax. In the early course of these inquiries, the Chinese were told in all seriousness that there would be no problem of communication or plane identification since the Seventh Fleet would stay completely away from Formosa. Incredulous Chinese officials pointed out that planes from a U.S. carrier would surely at some time or other approach the Formosan coast. What if a U.S. plane were in trouble far from its carrier--would it ditch at sea rather than land on Formosa? The American attitude remained: you boys just relax, you'll never see Seventh Fleet ships or planes.

The questions Formosa's Nationalists most urgently want answered are these:

P: Does Truman's ban on "mainland operations" include aerial reconnaissance?

P:Does the U.S. ban on further naval blockade mean that the Nationalists may not watch, search and seize Chinese ships carrying supplies from Hong Kong to the mainland? If so, will the Americans take their own measures to prevent the supply of the Chinese Communists--and the North Koreans --via the mainland?

P: Does the blockade prohibition further prevent the Nationalists from policing their own territorial waters--including those off Fornrosa as well as the waters off the mainland itself (which the Nationalists still consider "their" waters)?

Pointed as these questions are, they do not include the biggest question of all: Does the U.S. Government really think that it can protect and "secure" this island without protecting the government of this island? Does even the State Department persist in the illusion that it can ignore and destroy the government which rules this island without losing a position now acknowledged to be of vital interest to the U.S.?

Mission from Mac. So far there has been one ray of good sense in U.S.-Formosa relationships. It comes from General MacArthur. The Nationalist mission in Tokyo has been assured that MacArthur will send a military mission here to inspect and consult as soon as he can.

Otherwise, in all matters affecting U.S. military contact and security on this island, I see nothing but an indictment of those in Washington who have perpetrated this crime against the vital interests of our country. This feeling has not been stimulated or fostered by the Nationalist officials I have ( seen here; it stems entirely from what any child can observe in Taipei today.

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