What Next in Asia?

The first few days after the U.S. went into Korea, Americans experienced an immense feeling of relief: at last something had been done. By last week, as G.I.s were fighting doggedly to maintain their foothold on the peninsula (see above), much of that feeling had been transformed into the grimmer realization that far more remained to be done.

Korea was only a tiny appendix to a vast, Red land mass that stretched from the Arctic to the Gulf of Tonkin. Anywhere on its periphery a dozen more Koreas could flare up tomorrow. Washington seemed resigned to the defensive--to wait for the Communists to start the fire, and then to rush a U.S. fire brigade to the scene at the last minute.

Was this really all the U.S. could do?

The Winds of Power. It was not. There were signs that the U.S. did not know its own potential strength. All too many Washington policymakers seemed paralyzed by a form of intellectual defeatism which holds that the U.S. has little or nothing to offer Asia's millions, and that they are an easy prey to Communist blandishments. There was important evidence last week that, on the contrary, the U.S. has tremendous opportunities to win and organize friends in Asia.

Most significant item of evidence was an intelligence report received in Washington about the attitude of the Chinese Communists scattered throughout the countries of Southeast Asia. These Chinese, mostly shrewd traders and businessmen, are barometrically sensitive to the prevailing winds of power. When the Communists won in China, many of these Chinese nationals jumped on the Red bandwagon ; by last week they were jumping off again. Pictures of Communist Boss Mao Tse-tung were significantly disappearing from shop windows, applications for Communist Party membership dwindled.

This change of heart was caused by the firm U.S. action in Korea, and the U.S. pledge to defend Formosa. The lesson was clear and simple: Asians, even more than Europeans, have no use for friends who are not strong. By being strong, the U.S. can win Asia's friendship; the U.S. can lose it by failing to follow up the improvised but heartening stand it is making against Communism in Korea.

The Suggestions. What, specifically, can the U.S. do? Among the most plausible suggestions heard last week:

P:Dispatch some firemen before the fire starts, i.e., send really strong military missions--and possibly U.S. troops--to Asian danger spots. Purpose: to help local governments lick Communist rebellion, to train, supply and lead local armies.

P: Form an Asian high command for these forces, headed by General Douglas MacArthur and including Asians from each country involved.

P: Prepare a peace with Japan, enabling that country to resume trade with Southeast Asia and to maintain an army.

P: Recruit from the vast reservoir of American brains and guts a force of men willing to serve their country abroad, under rigorous conditions, put them through tough, practical training, and send them as political and economic advisers not only to governments but to individual communities in Asia. Put at their disposal an ECA-like fund for practical, short-to-medium-range aid and construction.

Ready for Responsibility. A lot of careful people, including Dean Acheson, would object to such measures because, among other reasons, they might "provoke" Communist China. It was true that the U.S. must guard against taking on more than it can handle; but it was time for the U.S. to stop being overly scared of Mao Tse-tung. The U.S. had good reason for not wanting to tangle with Red China; but Red China, faced with huge economic problems and internal dissension, had equally good reason for not wanting to tangle with the U.S.

What the U.S. faces, after Korea, is nothing more nor less than the assumption of responsibility for order and progress in Asia. History has placed that responsibility squarely on American shoulders; the American people, by their determined support of U.S. action in Korea, have shown that they are ready for that responsibility--readier than their leaders.

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