Ambling Through Washington

Something was wrong with the way the Korean war was going. Since the commanders and troops had done well with what they had, it was not hard to trace the fault line back to the men who prescribe the pace of U.S. mobilization. The pace desperately needed to be stepped up.

Phase One of the war had been the dismal series of retreats to a defensible beachhead line. Phase Two had been the creditable establishing and holding of the beachhead. But Phase Three--the buildup preparatory to a breakout--was moving too slowly. At the rate the manpower buildup was going last week, a general counteroffensive seemed no nearer than it had when the beachhead was first established. The enemy was still strong, still attacking, still forcing General Walker to dance to the Communist tune.

If new U.S. divisions had been flowing faster into Korea, General Walker would by now have some reserves. He would not be forced to shuttle troops from one crisis to another, or to pull war-weary troops into action before they had been rested. It was clearly not enough to kill more & more North Koreans, for the attrition of battle was working both ways.

Aside from the fact that attack requires more men than defense, when the projected counteroffensive got under way supply lines would lengthen and the front would rapidly widen out. The manpower requirement seemed to be about twelve to 15 divisions--not bobtailed Johnsonized divisions, but fully manned. In Europe the U.S. was taking on another commitment of five to ten divisions (see below), which were as necessary there, to fortify the free world's position, as the actual fighting divisions in Korea.

The pace of mobilization required by present U.S. obligations would have to be several times the pace at which Washington was ambling last week.

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