The Alternatives

THE NATIONS

The U.N. disaster in Korea faced the free world with a dreadful set of choices (see WAR IN ASIA). What were the policy alternatives open to the U.S. and its allies?

Course No. I. They could conclude that there was no more chance of avoiding or postponing World War III. They could begin dropping atomic bombs on the center of World Communist aggression--Russia--and take the feeble measures now available to minimize Russian retaliation. There is little chance that such measures could 1) stave off Russian atomic bombing of the U.S., perhaps of Britain, 2) defend Europe against Russian conquest, or 3) protect any part of the Asian mainland. Very long range, however, there was a chance that the U.S. and its allies could win such a war.

At Lake Success and in the capitals of the free world there was very little support, civilian or military, for Course No. 1.

Course No. 2. The U.S. and its allies could "ignore" Russia, open a full-scale atomic war on China. This had all the disadvantages of Course No. 1, without its advantages. There are few, if any, targets in China on which it would be worth while to use an atomic bomb. The dispersed Chinese army cannot be gravely damaged by atomic bombing.

This course had a little public support, but none among responsible officials.

Three other courses had stronger support than 1 or 2:

Course No. 3. Save the U.N. forces in Korea by asking for an armistice and paying the Communist price. The lowest price that the U.N. could get for an armistice would be something like this: 1) Korea under a U.N. occupation without U.S. or Chinese troops; 2) admission of Communist China to U.N.; and 3) abandonment of Formosa to the Chinese Communists. This price was higher than it seemed. Reason: the moral defeat involved would prove to Asiatic and European nations that the U.S. and the U.N. could not make good on their promises of protection against Red aggression. This would deepen the defeatist tendencies of anti-Communists in Asia and Europe. It would "buy time" and save an army, but it would greatly lessen the chances of ever effectively using the time or the army.

Another difficulty with the effort to get this "low price" was that the Chinese Communists had, in effect, already rejected it. Even before their victory in Korea, the Chinese Reds had scornfully kicked aside British and other feelers for such a deal.

The highest price to be paid in Course No. 3 would include all of the low-price items, plus withdrawal of Western troops from Japan and Western Germany--in short, less a Munich, more an Appomattox.

Under the most extreme circumstances of Choice 3, both Japan and Germany would soon be added to the Communist orbit. The people of both are strongly antiCommunist, but they are even more strongly determined not to be on the losing side of another war. Without Western help they will not stand up to Communist pressure. A Red Japan removes all hope of U.S. defense of the Western Pacific. A Red Germany removes all hope of thwarting Red domination of Western Europe.

The U.S. and its allies can probably save the troops in Korea if they are willing to pay this price.

Course No. 4. The U.S. and its allies, asking for no armistice, can extricate as many of their troops as possible from Korea, bring them home, let the rest of Asia fall to Red power. They can then concentrate on trying to defend a Europe whose reliance on U.S. and U.N. protection would have been damaged or destroyed by the calamity in Asia. Building of a defense for Europe has been lagging badly because of defeatism, neutralism, and the lack of a vigorous U.S. policy. Under Course No. 4 all of these dragging factors will probably increase.

Course No. 5. The U.S. and its allies can withdraw to Japan whatever they can save from Korea, and continue to fight a declared or undeclared war against Communist China. To do so, the U.S. would concentrate on using its predominant air and sea power to blockade China's vulnerable coastline, chop up its railroads and industries. China's Red bosses, whose power over the people is none too secure, will dread a long war with the U.S., fought on terms which the U.S. is able to dictate.

This course logically includes the following steps: 1) full support of Chiang Kai-shek and any other anti-Communist forces that are in China or that can be gotten into China; 2) the moral and material mobilization of Japan; 3) the military, political and economic strengthening of other non-Communist countries in Asia; 4) a rapid stepping-up of the defense of Europe.

This course requires a complete reversal of past & present U.S. State Department policy. Without a very strong U.S. policy, U.N. probably will not go along with Course No. 5. There is even a chance that opposition by U.N. members will be used to cloak a lack of determination in the U.S. State Department.

If, however, the U.S. is committed wholeheartedly to Course No. 5, the vast majority of U.N. nations will probably go along, because they have no chance whatever to defend themselves against Communist aggression unless they have U.S. help. Determination of basic anti-Communist policy is not and cannot be a question of achieving agreement between the anti-Communist allies. It is a question of U.S. decision, made with a decent regard for the opinions of the allies, but made essentially by the U.S., which alone has the power to make the alliance a reality.

Course No. 6. Some of the five courses above can be partly combined and modified--and a sixth course is always possible. This is to continue the policy of drift, of blind stumbling from crisis to crisis, of leaving the initiative (the choice of time, place and weapons) always in the hands of the enemy.

Of Course No. 6, recent history has provided the evaluation: it can lead only to World War III and to Communist victory therein.

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