As Others See Us

How do the U.S.'s friends abroad judge the U.S. in an hour of crisis in Asia? Last week, from five TIME foreign bureaus, came these answers:

From London: When the appalling reality of Red China's intervention in Korea first came home to Britons, they were struck with two fears. One was that rash American action would lead Britain into war with the locust-like Chinese masses--a war for which this country was as unripe psychologically as it was ill-prepared militarily. The other was that U.S. power would bog itself down in the bottomless quagmire of China, leaving Europe an unprotected plum to be plucked by the Russians at will.

For some days after the initial impact of the news, British faith in U.S. leadership was never lower, British distrust of the U.S.'s motives and methods never so strong. Resentment was nearly unanimous, and MacArthur became the whipping boy.

Just how much of Britain's uneasiness has been quieted by the Attlee-Truman talks is not yet certain. Britons are still asking: How do we keep from getting ourselves entangled in Asia?

From Paris: It is the quality of U.S. leadership, not basic U.S. military strength, that has gone on trial in Europe's eyes since the Korean defeat. With the exception of the Gaullists of France, non-Communist Europeans generally have found MacArthur guilty of gambling the greater part of U.S. ground strength on his private political hunch that the Chinese Communists would not strike. Now they wonder whether the U.S. plans to involve itself still deeper against the Chinese on a hunch that Russia will not honor its mutual defense treaty with China. They wonder whether U.S. industrial capacity will be able to support a two-front war against China on the one side and Russia, in possession of the Ruhr, on the other.

Loss of prestige pays out in loss of influence. The uproar that arose in both the House of Commons and the French Assembly over President Truman's misunderstood reference to the atom bomb was most of all a nervous expression of lack of faith in the capacity of American leadership to make wise decisions.

From Frankfurt: When the U.S. first took the field against North Korean aggression, U.S. prestige was saved from annihilation. Had the U.S. ignored this aggression, Germans would have lost all confidence in its determination to resist Soviet aggression. But U.S. prestige remained in a precarious state of health until the Inchon landing.

Germans react far more sensitively to concrete displays of effectiveness than to evidences of moral purity. While the U.S. was losing, Germans doubted it would ever be able to help them against aggression in Germany. Many sought Ru"ckversicherung (reinsurance) by signing Communist peace petitions, buying ads in Communist newspapers, reviving connections with East Germans and Russians. After Inchon, however, Germans could visualize for the first time substantial U.S. reinforcements against the threat of 300,000 crack Russian troops across the Elbe River. The latest Korean disaster has now scared many Germans into the belief that the U.S. will wear itself out in a full-scale war with China. It has destroyed the German hope that a large U.S. army would come to Europe in the near future.

If the U.S. is forced to withdraw from Asia or to neglect Europe, many Germans will reject resistance measures and again seek for Ru"ckversicherung.

From Rome: Italians would dread war under any circumstances, and the Korean disaster has alarmed and discouraged them. But the U.S.'s prestige does not depend on current setbacks or advances. Italians have seen too many of war's ups & downs to appraise the U.S. solely or even mainly on the Korean military record.

What they are looking for is sober courage, sober calculation. The U.S. performance shows fluctuating courage, fluctuating calculations. To politically wise Italians, the indecisive U.S. attitude toward Communist China is worse than either outright rejection or acceptance, for it looks as if the U.S. is not sure of its political judgment.

The U.S. still has the vast majority of the Italian people on its side. Appeasement of Communism would earn the U.S. their pity. Headlong, all-out war would earn their everlasting hatred. They are waiting for U.S. decisions which ring with steadfast courage and calculations for final victory. In short, the U.S. must demonstrate that it knows what it's about before it can establish a solid prestige. And once it establishes that faith by its actions in Asia, there is a good chance that Europe can really be rearmed and defended.

From Tokyo: U.S. prestige has not suffered appreciably, but neither is there a sudden urge to spring to arms against the Communists. Japan wants the most security it can get at the least cost. The Japanese are very polite, appreciate some phases of the occupation, but quietly hate Americans' guts. This is quite natural and logical.

The Japanese will fight to defend their land, and take any other action which might coincide with U.S. interests if it is to the advantage of the Japanese. Inasmuch as their interests and U.S. interests probably will coincide for some time yet, they are willing to help now.

From Belgrade: In Communist Yugoslavia, which should understand Moscow and Peking better than the free capitals, the reaction to the Korean crisis was notably tough. The authoritative Review of International Affairs urged a show of strength against the Red aggressors:

"A prerequisite for solving the Korean question consists in the first place of the United Nations retaining a firm hold and resisting any attempt aimed at imposing conditions for settlement . . . through aggressive action or blackmail.

"The real danger might arise only if a yielding policy toward aggressors were to prevail ..."

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.