The Nub of NATO

As the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Pact nations flew home from the Brussels conference last week, they left behind a paper outline for long overdue action.

The first of three immediate steps to be taken was organization of a supreme defense headquarters. By heartfelt, unanimous agreement, the Foreign Ministers put the U.S.'s General Dwight Eisenhower in charge. "I know," said "Ike" Eisenhower, "that it will be a long, hard task." It would be hard but, as Ike well knew, the Russians would decide whether it would be long. As his right hand and chief of staff, he chose an old crony of war plans and the bridge table, Lieut. General Alfred Maximilian Gruenther, 51, a steel-trap military mind and the U.S. Army's General Staff Deputy for Plans & Operations.

When Eisenhower and Gruenther take up their task in Europe early in January, they will have at their disposal the staff groundwork laid by the five Western Union governments (Britain, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg). Last week Western Union agreed to merge its two-year-old joint staff (headquartered at Fontainebleau under British Field Marshal Lord Montgomery) with the new NATO high command.

Step No. Two was an overall defense production board. This agency would coordinate the rearmament output of the twelve NATO members. Little progress had been made to date on standardization of equipment. The U.S. would be represented on this board by William L. Batt, a veteran World War II production man, former president of the S.K.F. Industries and present ECA chief in London.

The third step was a bid for German participation in West Europe's defense. Acting for NATO, the Allied High Commissioners in Germany--the U.S.'s John J. McCloy, Britain's Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and France's Andre Francois-Poncet--quickly conferred with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. After a five-hour meeting in the Petersberg, the conferees agreed 1) to discuss a new "political basis" for relations between Western Germany and the Western Allies, and 2) to organize a military committee* that would study "the scale and manner" of the German contribution to West Europe's defense. The allies seemed ready for a bargain that would end their occupation, give the Germans de facto sovereignty in return for 150,000 German troops in the West European army.

Underlying Weakness. NATO might have a hard time keeping to its timetable, which calls for increasing West Europe's present 19 divisions to 60 divisions by 1952's end. A far more serious matter of concern is the belief in some quarters that the timetable itself is too modest, that, given decisive and insistent leadership by the U.S., Europe could rearm much more quickly.

The underlying weakness of the Brussels plan of action is French inaction. If the French rearm rapidly, they will have less cause to fear German rearmament. But the French government is so deeply committed to a "go slow" policy on French rearmament that there seems little chance of a speedup.

Through the 1930s, France usually had at least 30 divisions under arms, 60 more trained divisions subject to call. Though its population is growing (2,000,000 more now than in 1946), though its production stands higher (30% more now than in 1940), France now has only five divisions in Europe (plus some 20,000 Frenchmen engaged in Indo-China), will muster only ten divisions by the end of 1951, under NATO's plan. These ten divisions will require only 250,000 men. In fact, that many men are already mobilized in France. Calling up a single annual class of conscripts (without political exemptions) would raise another 200,000. The real limitation of French military manpower mobilization is the government's unwillingness to try to associate the people with the rearmament effort.

Premier Rene Pleven's government is still fascinated by the old socialist slogan against the munitions manufacturers, "the merchants of death." Consequently, it will not turn to private enterprise for the weapons and equipment of the French army. The weapons that are to be produced in France will be made by the generally inefficient and high-cost government factories. The government is even reluctant to turn to private manufacturers to get buttons for military uniforms.

In short, the limitations of the rate of French rearmament are not population limitations and they are not economic limitations, they are political limitations, self-imposed by a government which has not yet really made up its mind to try to defend France against Communism.

Great Capabilities. With a change in heart and will, France could put 20 divisions in the field by 1951's end, and another 20 by 1952's end. By mobilizing its industry in earnest, it could contribute 5,000 fighter planes within two years. It could, in fact, keep a million men under arms without crippling its economy or imposing any grave hardship on its people.

But until the reservoirs of moral and material strength within the French nation are turned into the stream of European defense, there will be no all-out effort, and NATO's new outline for action may result in too little, too late. As the senior partner in West Europe's defense, the U.S. this week was facing the duty and the right of insisting on a serious French rearmament effort.

*The German representatives, appointed last week, included Lieut. General Hans Speidel, once Rommel's chief of staff, and Lieut. General Adolf von Heussinger. Both had been arrested by the Gestapo after the discovery of the plot on Hitler's life in July 1944.

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