Forward or Back?

The U.S. had maneuvered itself into an odd position on the Korean war. It had got from the United Nations a condemnation of Red China as an aggressor, but this action had a price: the more or less clear commitment from the U.S. that sanctions against Red China would not be requested.

This raised a basic question: What was the U.S. now trying to do in Korea? Hold the area against aggressors? That had been done against North Koreans. Possibly it could be done against Chinese Reds. But against North Koreans, Chinese Reds and Russians? Hardly.

For the U.S. to stay in Korea made good sense if that decision was looked on as part of a plan to punish the Chinese aggressor. The Chinese army could be fought in the north, while Red China's strength was drained by embargo and Nationalist attacks in the south. But to stay in Korea and not try to hurt Red China elsewhere would be just obstinacy, not policy.

With two-thirds of U.S. ground forces commited to Korea, unarmed Japan, greatest strategic asset in the Far East, was wide-open to Red attack.

U.S. policy had to move either forward or back. The Army last week was moving forward, although military men in Washington did not relish the Korean war in its present framework. The State Department was still hanging back.

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