A Question of Strategy

In a crowded, klieg-lighted hearing room on Capitol Hill last week, George Marshall filled in the details of U.S. plans for the defense of Europe--and in so doing all but ended the Great Debate. He disclosed to Congress and the world just how many U.S. troops would be committed to General Eisenhower's command.

Although Eisenhower had described the U.S. role in NATO chiefly as a supplier of arms and air power, he had made it clear that the U.S. would dispatch some troops; how many, he said, was an open question. For reasons of security, Marshall "reluctantly" expanded Eisenhower's cautious statement. He took the step, he said, because Western Europe's morale could be weakened by further debate that was "based on uncertainties."

The Pentagon and the President, he said, had approved a plan to maintain six divisions in Western Europe.

"The Greatest Factor." It was a somewhat less than startling disclosure. Two U.S. divisions are already in Germany--> some 100,000 men, counting various scattered constabulary, housekeeping troops and other spare parts. Four more combat divisions with their supporting troops would mean another 100,000--just about what Ohio's Robert A. Taft had already accepted as a reasonable figure.

It was not a large contribution of fighting power, the Secretary said. "It does represent a small Army unit of high efficiency and, we believe, a tremendous morale contribution to the effectiveness and buildup of the ... North Atlantic Treaty nations . . . The greatest factor in the creation of military strength for Western Europe is the buildup of morale --the determination to fight if that be necessary."

"If the Lord Is Good." Calm and deliberate, dressed in a neat grey suit, Marshall handled the shotgun questioning by the members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, under the snorting chairmanship of Texas' Tom Connally./-

What about ratios? Ratios mean restrictions, Marshall said; he could understand ratios on air or sea power, which could be changed overnight under changed circumstances, "but [ground] troops move like turtles."

If Congress imposed ratios or other restrictions on sending troops,would it imperil Europe's morale? Said George Marshall: "I think it would."

How long before he would want more than the six divisions? Said Marshall: "If the Lord is good to us through what may be a decade of tension," the U.S. might even be able to withdraw some troops. Then he did not believe the defense of Europe to be hopeless? Said Marshall: "No, sir. 1940 looked far more hopeless."

Added General of the Army Omar Bradley, following his chief to the stand: the departure of the four divisions would be staggered "until we see what the other, nations are doing." But Bradley underlined again the reiterated statement of Marshall and Eisenhower: U.S. troops to Europe now would do more to prevent war than any other action the U.S. could take. Said Bradley: "I'd much prefer to put a half a dozen divisions in Europe for ten or 20 years, than send 60 over there to fight a war ... We [the NATO nations] cannot withhold our own contributions to the collective security, waiting to see what another member contributes. This is not the time for suspicious scrutiny."

A Freshman's Advice. Then Secretary of State Dean Acheson did his best to settle the last, lingering suspicions that Europe was not doing enough in its own behalf. "Roughly speaking," said Acheson, "the combat forces of our European allies may be expected to double in the next year"--from more than 2,000,000 men under arms to more than 4,000,000.

But the soldiers' testimony was about all that Congress needed. The discussion of congressional authority, which probably never would have arisen except for Harry Truman's mulishness, had narrowed down to a discussion of military strategy. Republican opponents (and proponents) of the Administration's plans had changed their political fedoras for brasshats and were arguing over something they actually knew very little about.

At week's end, one of their colleagues made the point in a way that everyone could understand. Speaking before a Republican state convention in Detroit, Pennsylvania's Freshman Senator James Duff declared: "The men in charge of our military establishment are substantially the same group of generals who were responsible in World War II in the European theater for the greatest military success in the history of the American people. There is no reason to suppose that either their patriotism or their military judgment at this hour of grave crisis are less valuable or less dependable than they were at that other great time of crisis . . . It is necessary that they be trusted on this decision . . . The decision is a military decision and not a civilian one."

Despite the diehard objections of the Hoovers and the Tafts, despite a Hoover-like resolution signed by 121 Republican members of the House (but not supported by Republican leaders), Congress was ready to buy the generals' recommendations and the advice of bluff Jim Duff.

/- At one session, calling the roll of the joint committees, Connally came to the name of Estes Kefauver. "Kefauver!" he rumbled into the radio mikes. "Oh, he's after a crapshooter somewhere."

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