Bill of Particulars

The reasons for the unceremonious dismissal of MacArthur were closely searched, especially by Republican members of the committee.

"You say he can't support policies. I want to know what policies he can't support wholeheartedly and didn't support," snapped Wisconsin's Alexander Wiley. "You say it is cumulative. You should give a bill of particulars."

MARSHALL: "The policies were determined by the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council . . ."

WILEY: "All right. Those are generalities or conclusions."

MARSHALL: "The resolutions were not generalities."

WILEY: "Be specific."

Marshall cited the case of the doctrine of "hot pursuit." It arose when the Chinese attacked across the Yalu. Said Marshall: "At that period, we suffered very directly and very seriously from the fact that we could not carry our air beyond the Yalu River, and at that time the Chiefs of Staff brought forth a proposal that we should introduce as a first step hot pursuit [of attacking planes into Manchuria], of which I was very emphatically in favor." The U.S. put the question to its 13 U.N. allies, all of whom opposed it.

So hot pursuit was dropped, partly because of the allies, but also because "by the time we had gotten their reactions, our forces were south of the 38th parallel . . . where we had 200 miles in which to deal with the [enemy]."

WILEY: "Once you folks decided [what to do, MacArthur] did not violate that policy, did he?"

MARSHALL: "He did not violate the policy by military action, but he took issue with the policy before the world . . . He set up a very serious reaction among our allies . . . which threatened to leave us in a situation of going it alone."

WILEY: "Do you mean to say that a man in MacArthur's position, who was the Chief of Staff when you were a colonel, had no right to discuss or advise or recommend to you leaders in Washington?"

MARSHALL: "There was no limit whatever on his representations of his views to the officials in Washington. There is a great difference between that and the public announcements."

WILEY: "Now, let us be specific. What did he say or do that caused these allies of ours to have so much power that they apparently determined what should be done?"

MARSHALL: "They did not determine what should be done, but we had an issue with our allies before the world, when, in effect, this country--in connection with foreign policy--was speaking with two voices ... As to our allies, they did not determine General MacArthur's relief. They gave no expression of that kind, even remotely, that I can recall."

New Hampshire's Styles Bridges pointed out that Marshall had once pleaded for "that freedom of action which is so necessary to a military commander" for General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. "Don't you think that should apply equally to the Far East?"

MARSHALL: "If the circumstances were the same and the men were the same. I have great regard for General MacArthur's military capabilities. In fact, I played a very large part in his various assignments, promotions and decorations; but when it comes to the point of the commander not recognizing, being unwilling to recognize, the decisions of his government, that is another matter."

What about a recent magazine interview given by Lieut. General George E. Stratemeyer, commander of the Far East Air Forces, grumbling about the restrictions on bombing China bases? Was Stratemeyer to be dismissed? demanded New Jersey's Smith.

MARSHALL : "We didn't particularly appreciate the article at the time it came out, but we had enough of excitement in the air at the moment and he was not a person in the prominent position of General MacArthur."

BRIDGES: "Don't you believe that if a U.S. Senator or a Congressman of the U.S. writes a letter to a military policy-making man in authority . . . that he is entitled to get a frank reply?"

MARSHALL : "No, sir, I don't think from the senior commander, when he knows he is advocating something to the leader of the opposition party to the Administration that he, as the commander, is in total disagreement with his own people . . . That goes contrary to my precepts and understanding as a soldier . . . You are dealing with an organization where a man receives an order from even a captain which leads to his death or his wound, and he has to obey that order. He doesn't abate it, he obeys it, and that has to be instinctive. Now, if the example at the top is contrary to that, then you have got a very serious situation. . ."

What would Marshall have done if, as wartime Chief of Staff, he had considered some Administration policy not in the best interests of the country? "I would have done my best, directed to the President, to have it changed, and I might say I had some very difficult scenes with Mr. Roosevelt over certain phases . . . but I didn't make any public speeches ... I was not a very cheerful visitor on many occasions ... I have had occasions when I had to think very carefully as to whether I should take up an issue which would really mean an opposition to the Government policy and which would necessitate, I felt, my own retirement."

Question of Authority. Did Marshall approve of the abrupt manner of MacArthur's relief, asked Bridges, and of taking all his commands from him?

MARSHALL: "We had to consider what was going to be the position in which General Ridgway found himself . . . There was a specific discussion as to whether or not it would be desirable to retain General MacArthur in his role in relation to Japan only . . . That was set aside on the ground that it would put Ridgway in an almost impossible position because Japan was his base, and there would be a divided authority there that might make it very difficult to conduct affairs." As to jeopardizing the war, Ridgway was "intimately familiar with every stage of the military fight in that region. In fact, he was largely the director of it ... If it had been . . . somebody other than General Ridgway ... it would have been quite different."*

Had anybody thought of calling MacArthur back for a face-to-face discussion of their differences? asked California's Senator William Knowland.

MARSHALL: "I would assume that they thought an effort had been made by the President going out as far as Wake Island to see him." MacArthur, he noted, "has indicated a reluctance to come to this country." He recited three invitations from congressional committees since V-J day, one from himself as Chief of Staff, and one from President Truman as far back as 1946--all of which MacArthur declined with regrets.

Asked Oregon's Senator Wayne Morse: "Do you know of any time when General MacArthur did not have . . . full and adequate instructions as to what our policy in Asia was?"

MARSHALL: "I think he had everything his Government could give him." On Jan. 13, President Truman sent MacArthur a private message spelling out the Administration's policy and the reasons for its restrictions. As paraphrased to protect U.S. codes, the letter read in part: "Our courses of action at this time should be such as to consolidate the great majority of the United Nations. This majority is not merely part of the organization, but is also the nations whom we would desperately need to count on as allies in the event the Soviet Union moves against us. Further, pending the buildup of our national strength, we must act with great prudence insofar as extending the area of hostilities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves be justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities ... In the worst case, it would be important that if we must withdraw from Korea, it be clear to the world that that course is forced upon us by military necessity and that we shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified."

HICKENLOOPER: "In view of what has happened since the relief of General Mac-Arthur, if you had it to do over again, would you support the action?"

MARSHALL: "I would say yes, this was foreseen."

HICKENLOOPER: ". . . Foreseeing great doubt and confusion would arise in the minds of the American people?"

MARSHALL : "The decision came because it was felt it was unavoidable. It was also felt after the height of the emotional wave passed, there would be some sober thinking."

*The Eighth Army's present commander, Lieut. General James A. Van Fleet, was kept on twelve-hour alert for two months before his appointment, Marshall testified. Reason: Washington was worried about the way Ridgway took chances in going up to the front lines, wanted a successor ready.

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