Making Sense on Spain

In politics, as in other branches of morals, it is easy to be right in ideal circumstances. The heart of the matter is to be right in the circumstances that exist; these are never ideal, often ghastly.

Last week the U.S. Government revealed a painful decision that made good moral, political and military sense: Franco Spain would be accepted as an ally in the defense of Europe.

Instantly, an outcry against the decision went up from those who would not face the facts. The facts included: P:Spain's position on the map makes it a prime element in European defense, especially in air and sea war. P:Franco cannot be wished away. The U.S., Britain and France could probably have forced him out in 1946, if they had been willing to risk the consequences, including possible armed intervention in another Spanish civil war. They burked the challenge then; their half measures of diplomatic ostracism only strengthened Franco with his own people. P:Nobody denied that if war with Russia came, the U.S. and its allies would unhesitatingly turn to Franco for help.

More & more insistently, practical and responsible men in Washington asked themselves this question: why is it wrong to do now what would be done if war came?

By December 1950, this question had its inevitable answer. Stanton Griffis was sent to Madrid as ambassador with instructions to prepare the way for bringing Spain into the European defense setup. He did his job. Last week Washington's decisions and Griffis' work bore two fruits:

1) Admiral Forrest Sherman, who was to die a few days later (see NATIONAL AFFAIRS), talked with Franco in Madrid and reached a preliminary agreement that should lead to U.S. air and naval bases in Spain in return for U.S. economic aid;

2) Franco thoroughly revamped his cabinet, liberalizing it.

How much it is liberalized is the subject of some disagreement in the U.S. press. The New York Times, whose C. L. Sulzberger is carrying on a devious anti-Franco crusade, gives the impression that nothing much happened in Spain. In a sense, that is true. The new cabinet is loyal to Franco, and Franco is still a dictator.

However, Franco is also a patriotic Spaniard who does not always put the interests of his Falange Party first. The Falange, which is the worst element in present Spanish politics, lost ground in the cabinet shakeup. The army held its ground. Monarchists (meaning, in Spain, conservatives who deplore much in the Franco regime) got nine out of 16 cabinet seats, a gain of three. There was serious talk that Franco might put young (13-year-old) Juan Carlos, son of the Pretender Don Juan, on the throne.

The progressive wing of the church is rising in influence; Catholic Action's Martin Artajo is still Foreign Minister and emerges clearly as Spain's No. 2 political figure. Restrictions on the press and on business are likely to be relaxed.

All this does not constitute a democratic revolution; neither is it peanuts.

The British and French Foreign Offices protested to Washington against a deal with Franco. This time, however, there was no Washington talk (as there was last spring during the MacArthur crisis) of how the U.S. could not act without its allies. Acheson stood firm. France and Britain soon made it clear that their protests had been made for home consumption only.

Next task is to get the haughty and isolationist Spaniards integrated with the rest of Europe, which they despise. Like almost all other worthwhile jobs challenging U.S. leadership, that one will be tough, too.

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