Monday, Aug. 20, 1951

Declining Chips?

Twice more last week the Communists backed down--just when it looked as if the Korean truce talks were verging on total collapse.

The Communists had already admitted the illegal presence of their armed soldiers in Kaesong. Matt Ridgway insisted that he would resume the talks only if the Reds clearly understood that further violations would end the truce talks automatically. After digesting this for 52 hours, the Reds sent another message. The key paragraph: "It is inconceivable that there will be any further failure on our part to comply . . . unless you should deliberately fabricate incidents as an excuse to terminate the armistice negotiations." U.N. strategists ignored the insults, accepted the "inconceivable" assurance.

The Big Silence. When, after a five-day lapse (longest so far), the teams faced each other again in Kaesong, the Reds trotted out their moth-eaten demands for a buffer zone along the 38th parallel, as if they were brand-new. Admiral Joy made it clear that his side still insisted on a more defensible line, approximating present battle positions, but that he was willing to discuss some compromise. One day, after Joy had stated his position, Nam II sat silent for two hours and eleven minutes, chain-smoking through his curved cigaret holder, fidgeting and looking at his watch. Joy bore the "Big Silence" (as U.N. reporters dubbed it) with fortitude. Finally, he suggested that, since the buffer zone question was at an impasse, the negotiators take up some other agenda item. Nam II refused. He would not even show Joy on a map whether or not he understood the U.N. concept of a defensible cease-fire line.

Said Admiral Joy, with icy anger: "You did not come here to stop the fighting, you did not come here to negotiate an armistice, you came here to state your political price for which you are willing to sell the Korean people a temporary respite from pain. You are engaged in these conferences only to present demands, not to negotiate solutions."

This outburst apparently shook the Reds. Next day, Nam mildly produced a map, 2 1/2 by 4 feet, and passed it across the table. The markings clearly showed that the Reds understood the U.N. requirements. The 38th parallel was in its proper place and so were the present front-line positions, only slightly distorted in the Communists' favor. This week the Reds were still obdurate. But Nam, who had stalked angrily out after an earlier session, was nervously agitated, like a gambler worried by his declining pile of chips.

The Whip Hand. Smarting under their forced public admission that they had violated the neutral zone, the Reds launched--both officially and unofficially--a spate of charges that the U.N. was cheating too. They complained that U.N. planes bound for North Korean targets had flown over Kaesong (true, but not covered by any agreement); that allied gunfire was audible in Kaesong (true, but the guns were being fired outside the neutral zone); that the allies were using poison gas (untrue). Their most serious charge was that one of their white-flagged truce trucks had been fired on by allied planes. Joy did not deny that, but he pointed out that the alleged attack took place considerably east of the main Pyongyang-Kaesong road, suggesting that the Reds were "abusing the use of white markings."

At first the Reds had portrayed themselves as victors, the U.N. as humbly begging for peace. But the tone of their propaganda had changed to one of whining complaint. They now accused the U.N. of being autocratic and arbitrary. When, during the five-day lapse, the Peking radio accused Ridgway of refusing to set a date for resumption of the truce talks, even illiterate peasants could reason that, if Ridgway could turn the talks off & on at will, it was he who had the whip hand.

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