Reward for a Triumph

One day last April, John Foster Dulles was flying toward Tokyo and Douglas MacArthur, just fired by Truman, was on his way home. As the planes passed each other, the two architects of the Japanese peace communicated from plane to plane. MacArthur's Hiawathan message to Dulles: "Carry on with the peace."

Last week John Foster Dulles, who engineered one of the most important diplomatic maneuvers ever undertaken by the U.S., was moving toward the sidelines of the U.S. policymaking field. He had not been fired, like the other builder of peace in Japan, but he had been quietly eased out of a position in U.S. policymaking.

In March 1950, Dulles was given the job of building the Japanese peace treaty. Here was a specific policy objective, surrounded by formidable hurdles, to be reached as rapidly as possible. The first hurdles were in Washington. The State Department was not very clear about what kind of a treaty it wanted. The Pentagon dragged its feet because it did not see how a treaty could be written that would not endanger U.S. use of Japan as a base, especially with the Korean war going on. Dulles achieved Washington agreement on the kind of a treaty the U.S. wanted; then he tackled the U.S. allies.

A Solid Phalanx. Australia, the Philippines and some other nations wanted a treaty more severe on Japan. The U.S. wanted a Japan able to stand on its feet and contribute to the stabilization of Asia. One of the most dangerous conflicts was with Britain. Shortly after Herbert Morrison became Foreign Secretary in March 1951, the British government thought that Japan should not recognize the Chinese Nationalist government in Formosa as the government of China. Dulles flew to London. He tried to persuade the British to let Japan decide for itself which Chinese government to recognize. The British cabinet first decided not to go along on this basis, later reversed its decision.

Dulles then flew to Tokyo, got Japanese agreement, and was brilliantly successful in subsequent negotiations with the governments of Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.

When the Russians decided to attend the San Francisco conference on the Japanese treaty, they did not know how successful Dulles had been. The Kremlin probably hoped to reopen old cleavages among the anti-Communist allies. By keeping his eye on the main objective and by scrupulously attending to every detail, Dulles created a solid anti-Communist phalanx at San Francisco, and the Russians suffered a humiliating diplomatic defeat. The State Department got much of the credit.

A Partisan Crack. The U.S. is faced with other challenges that require the kind of work Dulles did on the Japan treaty. Germany is one such case; the Middle East is another. Dulles was given no new assignment of this kind. Instead, Harry Truman offered him the post of ambassador to Japan, not a policymaking job. Dulles declined (as he had said earlier that he would).

The day after Dulles called at the White House, Harry Truman spoke of the visit at his press conference. The President said that Dulles had declined the ambassador's post because he felt he must stay in America and save the Republican Party from isolationism. Dulles answered this partisan crack with a calm statement indicating that the President had not correctly given Dulles' reason for turning down Truman's offer. Said Dulles: "As regards the Republican Party, I do not share the President's concern. The Republican Party is not isolationist, and I see no danger that it will become so."

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