Sea of Troubles

"They were as unstable as water," T. E. Lawrence wrote of the Arabs in Seven Pillars of Wisdom, "and like water would perhaps finally prevail. Since the dawn of life, in successive waves, they had been dashing themselves against the coasts of flesh. Each wave was broken, but, like the sea, wore away ever so little of the granite on which it failed . . . The wash of [each] wave, thrown back by the resistance of vested things, will provide the matter of the following wave . . ."

The whole Moslem sea tossed and rolled last week, lapping at the granite of the old order. British troops were in action to stand off Egypt's violent demand for the Suez and Sudan. Moslem Pakistan and the West were jarred by the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Iran, through the United Nations' reluctance to intervene, won a dubious victory over Britain, salving pride but refining no oil. Neighboring Iraq wanted to revise its treaty of alliance with Britain. The wave of Moroccan resistance to the French gained new matter from the other waves of nationalism breaking near by.

More Than Wet Feet. Headlines and bloodshed gave an air of newness to crises that had actually been evolving for years. The waves had been moving forward since the collapse of Turkey's Ottoman empire and, more energetically, since the end of World War II. The West was belatedly learning that it was in for more than a case of wet feet.

The time has passed when Britain or France could repair the damage, let alone dike the waves and stop the crumbling. The U.S., as it had been in Europe and

Asia, is faced with steering the lifeboats and supervising the disaster teams. The Moslem world, frantic to shake off oppression and poverty that it ascribes solely (and not altogether correctly) to Western exploitation, has frequently responded with a fanatical and irresponsible nationalism. That way is apt to lead to continued poverty, chaos and neutralism at the least, to ultimate capture by Communism at the worst.

Different Garments. There could be no solution as in 1947, when the U.S. simply took over Britain's responsibilities in Greece and Turkey. In the Middle East, Britain's responsibility extends to oilfields and air bases in Iraq, guardianship of Suez and the Sudan, the tutorship of Jordan, to Aden and its naval base, troops in Eritrea, air bases at Derna and Tobruk in Libya, heavy naval responsibility in the eastern Mediterranean. Even if it were feasible (which it is not), the U.S. could not don the discredited garments of colonialism which Britain and France have worn for decades in the Middle East.

With almost casual candor, Dwight Eisenhower last week restated an old American feeling. The U.S. must support the "legitimate aspirations" of the Moslem world from Dakar to Mindanao, he said, "or else I don't see how we can hold true to our doctrine that we do not want to dominate anyone." Legitimate, of course, was the key word; it did not mean abandoning the Middle East to headlong, irresponsible nationalism. The great colonial powers had long preached that a people has to be emotionally, intellectually and economically ready before it can safely run its own house. In its self-righteous '303, the U.S. derided such talk as hypocritical. But troubles in such suddenly freed nations as the Philippines, Burma and Indonesia have made the U.S. think again.

Twist the Old Around. The worst of all choices, as in Iran, is to move in with no policy, and assume no responsibility, bewildering both sides. In Egypt, U.S. resolves are firmer and unmistakable. The U.S. stands firm with Britain against Egyptian demands for the Suez and Sudan, but presses for a Middle East command which would put the U.S., Britain, France, Egypt and Turkey in control of the canal as partners. (Despite Egypt's first huffy rejection of the proposal, State Department officials are still confident that Cairo will accept it.) In Morocco, the U.S. plans to resist that nation's demand for a complete break from France, but in its role as a tenant at Morocco's strategic airfields, the U.S. will urge the French to give the Moroccans more freedom. The central idea, a high U.S. official explained, is "to twist the old colonialism around"--backing the old order so long as it is necessary to preserve stability, but working to modify it too, recognizing that enduring stability in the Middle East must come from a willing partnership of the people there.

The U.S. is starting late and wading into a region where passion rules reason and men of moderation risk death. It is not exactly welcome, either. The Arabs dislike the French and British, have an old hatred for the newest U.S. partner, Turkey, and mistrust the U.S. itself for siding with Israel. For every two Arabs, it is said, there is one quarrel, and the U.S. is going to find itself in the middle of most of the quarrels.

It is going to be another perilous voyage on a sea of troubles.

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