Monday, Dec. 10, 1951

Item 3

Once a temporary cease-fire line was agreed upon, the negotiators in the tent at Panmunjom went on to harder matters. They sank their teeth into the "tough gristle of Item 3, which concerns supervision of the armistice after it is signed. Meanwhile, the 30--day trial period, which expires Dec. 27, started ticking away.

Everyone knew that Item 3 would be difficult. Key point of the U.N. proposal was that joint U.N.-Communist observation teams should be given access to all parts of Korea. Key point of the Communist proposal was that a joint armistice commission should be set up with, apparently, no authority to inspect anything but the 2 1/2-mile buffer zone between the armies. A deadlock immediately ensued. Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy rejected the Red scheme as toothless. Lieut. General Nam II, the deadpan North Korean commander, rejected the U.N. plan as a "brazen interference" with the internal affairs of North Korea.

Chilly Language. As the argument over Item 3 wore on, with no settlement in sight, all sorts of new problems and extraneous issues cropped up. Admiral Joy beefed up his inspection proposal by suggesting that air patrols as well as ground teams should be provided for. The Reds demanded the right not only to repair existing airfields in North Korea, but to construct new ones during the armistice period. Their argument: "wanton bombing" by the U.N. had deprived them of adequate air defenses. In spite of two roaring stoves in the conference tent, the air was chilly with frigid language and stale with monotonous repetition. Admiral Joy said that U.N. forces were willing to be inspected, and asked a simple question of the Communists: "What do you plan to hide?"

Red About-Face. Just when the Reds appeared most stubborn, they performed a dramatic about-face. They accepted the principle of inspection and of a military "freeze" of existing forces. They proposed that: 1) neither side should introduce into Korea "any military forces, weapons and ammunition under any pretext during an armistice"; and 2) observation teams manned by nationals of "neutral" countries should inspect "ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon."

At first blush, this seemed to come close to meeting U.N. demands, and looked like an even bigger concession than the Communist abandonment of the 38th parallel. If the Reds meant what they said, it would be the first time in any postwar negotiations that an Iron Curtain country has been willing to let outsiders in for a look around. Cautiously pleased but wary of booby traps, Joy's team prepared a list of 21 questions which they wanted the Reds to answer. For example, just what countries would the Communists consider neutral. Nam II promised a prompt answer.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.