Package Deal

The heaviest engagements last week were fought in the two conference tents at Panmunjom. Bitter argument continued on the emotion-charged issue of the prisoners (see below); but, however that was settled, it would not affect the shape of the peace. The shape of things to come lurked in the other tent, where U.N.-Communist negotiators were still trying to come to terms on means of safeguarding an armistice.

The U.N. was eager, perhaps overeager, to break the logjam by making concessions. But Ridgway's men were stoutly determined not to allow the Reds unlimited rights to build and repair airfields in North Korea. The Reds insisted on doing what they pleased in their own territory. Said Red China's Hsieh Fang: "We are deeply aware of the fact that you are very much afraid of our military air power."

"Nothing Further." Finally the U.N. negotiators offered their opponents a five-point package deal with a take-it-or-leave-it label. The U.N. would agree on: 1) limited instead of unlimited troop rotation; 2) inspection teams from neutral nations for behind-the-lines observation; 3) a double instead of a single inspection system (one group behind the lines, one for the buffer zone; 4) no U.N. air observation; 5) rehabilitation of "certain" North Korean airfields for civilian use. In return the Reds must agree, positively, not to construct or use airfields for military purposes.

Said the U.S.'s Major General Howard Turner: "We now have conceded to your unreasonable views all that we can concede. From this moment, we shall have nothing further to propose. If in truth you sincerely desire an armistice, I urge you to accept the U.N. Command's proposal . . . The issue is in your hands."

The Communists agreed that these proposals represented "a step forward." Next day, however, they rejected them. They still wanted complete freedom of action in the matter of the airfields. And so deadlock settled down again.

Peace or War? Still, many correspondents and military men on the scene expected this one to yield, as others had. They expected an early peace; they could feel it in the air and in their bones. Another school of thought holds that the Communists never intend to reach final agreement, that they are using the truce conferences as a ruse to protect their buildup for a crushing offensive, just as the Chinese Reds, while fighting the Nationalists in the civil war, had made treacherous use of truces to gather strength for the next attack. The pessimists point to the Red buildup which is still going on. The optimists in high places at Panmunjom, at Tokyo and in the Pentagon concede this possibility, but still believe that the Reds, in their way--their stubborn, evasive, treacherous, exasperating way--are groping toward a truce.

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