The Ticking Package

At first nobody noticed that the package ticked. But by last week, Russia's offer of a German peace treaty, and promise of an armed, unified, unoccupied, "independent" Germany (TIME, March 24) was on every European's mind. It set off these new stirrings:

Socialists: Sent British Labor's Hugh Dalton, once Chancellor of the Exchequer, scurrying to Paris to agree with French Socialists that Russia's offer ought to be considered, and that German rearmament in the West's defense must not happen. Then they decided to meet with German Socialists who feel the same way.

Communists: Badly shaken up, had to about-face without warning--and in public. For seven years they had warned of the horrors of German rearmament; now Russia promised Germany an army of its own. For seven years they had denounced ex-Nazis; now the Russians specifically invited ex-Nazis into a German army. French Communists were particularly embarrassed. It was the hardest thing to swallow obediently since Stalin drank a toast to Hitler.

West Germans: Saw their Chancellor Adenauer dismayed. Unswerving friend of the West, he was finding his own colleagues taking deep swigs out of the Soviet bottle. Muttered Jacob Kaiser, his minister for All-German affairs: "Germany and the West must consider seriously whether or not a turning point has been reached . . ." Said Free Democratic Leader August Martin Euler, Adenauer's political ally: "For the first time, the Soviet has come up with a proposal worth discussing."

Western Allies: Spent ten days drafting identical replies to Moscow. They recognized the propaganda appeal of Russia's offer to the Germans. They aimed to leave all doors open--even though nothing but a cold draft was coming through. They asserted in moderate tones: 1) that if Russia is sincere, Russia should admit a U.N. commission to East Germany to determine whether free elections can be held there; 2) that the Russians fail to say whether unified Germany could conduct its own foreign" policy, could join in various European agencies like the Schuman Plan; 3) that Russia invokes the Potsdam Agreement to keep German territory east of the Oder-Neisse rivers, while proposing to revive the German army, prohibited by Potsdam.

If it hadn't learned before, the U.S. had learned at Panmunjom the folly of trying to sit friendly-like around a table with the Russians, as if little differences in wording are only a matter of semantics and easily straightened out. Many Europeans, hungry for easy solutions, seemed unwilling to acknowledge this fact. Luckily for the West, the key man in the play--76-year-old Chancellor Adenauer--was not taken in. He stuck to his determination to align his people with the West, even though the unification of his country must be postponed. The West could be grateful for him last week.

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