Point for the West

In the diplomatic struggle for Germany, the West for a change won a major tactical victory. It checkmated the Russian offer of a united but "neutralized" Germany with a better offer of its own.

The West's offer was made to the Kremlin but addressed primarily to the German people. A German settlement, the West said, can only be worked out if there is a "genuinely representative all-German government, formed as a result of free elections and able to participate in full freedom in the discussion of a peace treaty." A united Germany must be free and sovereign, safe from outside interference, and secure from any domestic putsch. Above all, the West insisted, Germany must have "the basic right of a free and equal nation to associate with other nations," e.g., in the European Defense Community (E.D.C.). To deny this right, as Russia did, would mean "permanent shackles" on German sovereignty.

Free Votes. After making these points, the West agreed to confer with the Russians "as soon as it is clearly apparent that the Soviet government [intends] to avoid the fruitless negotiations of the past." To establish its good faith, Russia should:

P: Allow an "impartial commission" to determine whether there exist in East Germany the conditions necessary for free elections. Such conditions--free balloting, freedom to campaign, etc.--must be maintained "not only on the day of voting, and prior to it, but also thereafter."

P: I Assure the West that a freely elected All-German government will have "freedom of action" (to join defensive alliances) both before & after an all-German peace treaty is signed.

As its choice for impartial investigator of electoral conditions, the West named the U.N. ("the quickest and most practical course"). It would accept any other "precise and practical" alternative, but not the Big Four Commission vaguely proposed by the Russians. Such a body, said the West, would be "both judge and party," i.e., Russia would have a verdict-rigging veto.

Free Choice. The heart of the West's reply was its bluff-calling challenge to the Kremlin to give the Germans freedom as well as union, with no shackles attached.

West Germans were delighted. "Moscow must come clean," headlined the liberal Frankfurter Rundschau. Even the Socialists, self-styled protagonists of a "deal with the Soviets" hummed with approval over the Big Three note. "We really ought to claim authorship," beamed one. "It's just what we want."

What the Socialists had wanted most was the West's recognition that a free and united Germany, when & if it is formed, must be master in its own house. German freedom to join E.D.C. implied a converse freedom: to walk out at will. The West was plainly betting that a really free, united Germany would voluntarily cast its lot with the democracies. It was a risk that in the long run had to be taken. Having abandoned its quavering fear at the very thought of a united Germany--a posture that was doing real harm in West Germany--the West returned to its more immediate task, giving West Germany its peace (see below).

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