Pursuit of Disaster

The news of the week from Korea, dominated by General Boatner's success in cleaning up the prisoner-of-war camps (see WAR IN ASIA), was ominously backlighted by a more enduring fact: the Korean war, long in a mess, is falling into a worse mess day by day. Washington muddling has fashioned a deadfall in which U.S. policy has been trapped. The current U.S. policy position 1) gives the Reds every reason not to allow a truce and 2) invites the Reds to take the offensive in Korea, or elsewhere in Asia, with the assurance of minimum retaliation from the U.S.--or none at all.

Holds Barred. U.S. policy as of last week: 1) If a truce is reached and the Communists later return to the offensive in Korea, the U.S. and its allies by agreement will strike back by bombing and blockading China. But no such agreement has been reached to cover attacks elsewhere in Asia.

2) If a truce is not reached and the Reds return to the offensive in Korea, using chiefly ground forces, the U.S. will limit its counterblows to Korea, will not allow its aircraft to cross the Yalu.

3) If the Reds return to the offensive and throw in their China-based air power (an estimated 2,000 planes, half of them jets), then, says General Mark Clark, there "should be no holds barred." But the Pentagon and the National Security Council do not agree. They have ordered Clark to bar all holds except limited hot pursuit. This weird phrase means that Clark's air force would be allowed to pursue Red planes back across the Yalu, but they would not be allowed to attack Red bases.

Maximum Risk. Limited hot pursuit (or lukewarm pursuit) puts General Clark and his soldiers in another of the stupid and dangerous positions that have characterized the war in Korea. It exposes them to maximum risks, ties their hands for counteraction. As General Clark reported last week, the Reds have used the eleven months of truce talks to double their air and ground strength.

One U.S. commander--Major General Daniel Hudelson, outgoing commander of the 40th Division (California National Guard)--drew some grim conclusions from these facts last week. The Communists, said Hudelson, now have the power to drive the U.N. forces out of Korea. On the word of other top commanders, his estimate of the situation is too pessimistic, but Army Secretary Frank Pace's rebuttal --"[We can] meet any challenge the Communists may make"--was certainly far rosier than Clark's report warranted. Retorted Hudelson: "Secretary Pace . . . undoubtedly has information not available to a poor old broken-down commander just back from Korea."

Meanwhile, Washington showed its impotence in other phases of Asia policy:

P: The U.S. has allowed the political situation in South Korea to flounder to a point where old (77) Syngman Rhee could make the U.S. look ridiculous by cutting off Voice of America broadcasts (see WAR IN ASIA). The real point of the Rhee scandal is that after two years of war in Korea, the U.S. has neither been able to trust Rhee or to find some other leader whom it could trust.

P: The U.S. is still not prepared to use Chiang Kai-shek's Formosa-based forces as a threat to Red China's flank. In Washington last week Admiral Arthur Radford, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, reported that U.S. arms aid to Chiang is "disappointingly slow."

Last week it was clear as never before that, in Asia, the U.S. is in limited hot pursuit of disaster.

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