Disappointing Performance

City-proud Parisians often grumble that the U-shaped sprawl of prefabs surrounding their Palais de Chaillot is an architectural eyesore that ought to be removed. It houses NATO's Secretariat. Last week NATO was under notice from the Parisian city fathers to vacate its premises and move to a less conspicuous spot outside the city. To NATO's detractors, the notice seemed symbolic of the fact that many Europeans, conceding that NATO is here to stay, increasingly prefer to keep it out of sight and out of mind.

Last week NATO staffers measured the effects of this growing sentiment on Europe's defense effort. Gathering up confidential statistics from their 14 member nations in preparation for the NATO foreign ministers' full-dress conference on Dec. 15, the NATO Secretariat matched performance against the handsome promises made at the Lisbon Conference (TIME, March 3). The verdict: disappointing progress in 1952, with prospects of worse performance in 1953.

This Year. The Lisbon Conference established 1) a minimum target of 50 divisions (25 ready to fight, 25 in reserve) and 4,000 aircraft by the end of 1952 2) a buildup program to 70 divisions by 1953, to 98 divisions and 10,000 aircraft by 1954. Promised such progress, Dwight D. Eisenhower commented: "Visible and within grasp we have the capability ... of such strength as the Communist world would never dare challenge."

But the grasping has proved nettlesome. With 26 divisions* and 3,500 aircraft combat-ready in Western Europe, NATO superficially seems to have hit its 1952 target. Compared with last year's NATO force of 18 active divisions, this is an improvement; compared with the 100 divisions and 7,000 aircraft that Russia has available, it remains dangerously inadequate. More important, the roll call of Allied "reserves" is woefully short. Some 20 reserve divisions exist in embryo, but few would be ready for action within the 30-day mobilization period specified by NATO. Without more reserves, says NATO Supreme Commander General Matthew B. Ridgway, Europe lacks the minimum military requirement to "take and turn a Russian assault."

Next Year. Even more serious is the withering away of NATO's 1953-54 program. From their answers to NATO's questionnaires, it appears that European governments have been smitten with the Cold Peace notion that the danger of war is receding, and that it is time to concentrate less on guns, more on butter.

BRITAIN, enmeshed in far-flung colonial police actions and still half broke, made plain by its answers that its 1953 contribution will fall about 40% below its Lisbon estimates for men, 50% for aircraft. Instead of reinforcing its army of the Rhine, the Tory government will present next week's NATO conference with only the assurance that, as yet, it does not contemplate withdrawing a single British soldier from the Continent. Partly in rationalization of their decision to hold strength at 1952 levels, the British talk airily of "new weapons" (e.g., U.S. atomic artillery) which might reduce the need for men on the ground. But economics is still at the root of the trouble. Forced to guard its solvency by gambling with its safety, Britain is exporting a sizable fraction of its arms production (e.g., Centurion tanks) to earn foreign exchange.

FRANCE, drained of men and money by the Indo-China war, sees no hope of recruiting the three new divisions it promised for '53. The French blame their shortfall on 1) the diminishing yearly intake of French conscripts--the result of the low birth rate in the '30s; 2) lagging arms shipments from the U.S. All NATO divisions except the British rely on U.S. arsenals for 70% of their tanks, trucks and artillery, 50% of their communications gear; but with Korea as Priority No. 1, the U.S. has so far delivered only one-third ($3.2 billion worth) of the military hardware allotted to Europe since 1950. France has told NATO that its 1953 arms budget might easily be slashed unless the U.S. coughs up at least $125 million more in military aid.

BENELUX, too, plans sharp reductions. Prosperous Belgium plans to halve its military spending; Holland, which promised five divisions by 1954, expects to have only three.

In short, said a NATO officer, "nobody thinks the original military goals for the next few years are possible any more."

Vote of Confidence. The European Army (EDC), with its promise of twelve German divisions, is the only remaining hope for speedy reinforcement. But the prospect of German troops, even in European Army uniforms, frightens the French far more than the Russians. Paris insists on parity with the Germans, but the French idea of parity is to trim down Germany below France's size.

Last week the Bundestag gave EDC --and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer--a rousing vote of confidence by agreeing (220-160) to debate ratification this week. German approval seems fairly well assured. The rest is up to France.

*U.S. six, Britain four, France eight, Italy three, Benelux four, the rest one.

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