The Time of Truce-Making

In an essay on the proposition "That the Hour of Truce-Making Is Dangerous," Michel de Montaigne recalled: "[The Spartan King Cleomones] made a seven-day truce with the people of Argos, then attacked them on the third night while they were asleep and expecting no harm; the excuse he gave was that the [seven-day] truce made no mention of nights."

Every day last week brought new conciliatory words and deeds from the Communist camp (see INTERNATIONAL). The U.S., long braced against insult and aggression from that quarter, was perplexed, a little scared, and in some danger of losing its balance because of the unexpected yielding of its adversary. The U.S. had to face the probability that the new Communist attitude was more than a flurry, that it might be continued for months or years. What did the Communist moves mean? How should the U.S. meet them?

At first, the most common U.S. reaction was skepticism. Asked what they thought of the Communist overtures, plain people and statesmen said: "It's just another trap," or "I wouldn't trust those rats," or "They're trying to fool us again." Said Republican Senator Bourke Hickenlooper: "I don't see any sincerity in it ... They have a completely ulterior purpose."

Optimism cropped out here & there, too. Said North Dakota's Senator William Langer: "I believe the Russians are sincere, and I don't think they're trying to divide us from our allies at all."

Hot Diplomacy. Neither 100% skepticism nor wide-eyed optimism will be adequate to guide U.S. policy now that hot diplomacy has been added to cold war. It would be folly to accept the sincerity of Communist long-range peaceful intentions as stated by Malenkov in his oration at Stalin's funeral. It might be equally disastrous for the U.S. to turn its back on all new arrangements with the Communists on the ground that Communist aims cannot be trusted. It is true that the Communists intend all deals to work to their advantage and to U.S. disadvantage, and that they will break any deal it is to their advantage to break. Despite this, the U.S. can make many deals that will work to its advantage--and it can do so without trusting Communists.

The Communist moves are not peaceful in intent, but the U.S. aim must be to handle them so that the result works for peace--by what President Eisenhower calls "self-enforcing treaties." The Reds may not mean what they say, but the U.S., if it plays its cards right, can make them act as if they did. Nobody runs out on a deal when he will clearly lose more by breaking his word than by keeping it.

The Communists may agree on and faithfully carry out an exchange of wounded prisoners in Korea, and from there go on to an exchange of other prisoners. They can then agree to a Korean truce. A truce will be good or bad for the U.S., depending on its terms, on U.S. ability to enforce them, and on other countermoves which the U.S. and the Communists make in Asia.

If the U.S. leaves a weak and divided Korea, if it lets Red China into the U.N., it will serve notice on all Asians that the Communists are winning the struggle for Asia, and millions of Asians will drift to the Communist banner. But a Korean truce does not have to be that kind of truce, either in its terms or its enforcement.

Situation of Danger. Between them last week. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles defined the two sides of U.S. policy toward Communist conciliation. Dulles said: "Nothing which has happened, or which seems to me likely to happen, has changed the basic situation of danger." At his press conference, Eisenhower said that the U.S. should accept at face value the Communist peace overtures, and proceed in the hope of making agreements.

The two statements are not contradictory. The U.S. does not and will not trust Communists on their promises; but it will seek arrangements with them in which the U.S. relies not upon Communist sincerity but upon its own strength.

This necessary policy is difficult and dangerous. The danger will increase if the Communists actually carry out some commitments, and thereby again delude Americans and others with the notion of Communist "sincerity." At the moment, the non-Communist world is fairly well united, but it was welded in the intense heat of stubborn and reckless Communist aggression. If the heat is removed, will the weld hold? Or will there be a revival of French neutralism, British intellectual anti-Americanism, and another rise of Communist fellow-traveling in the U.S.?

Many of the fellow travelers of the 1930s are now anti-Communist on the superficial ground of Stalin's postwar rapacity and bullying. They have not yet learned that international immorality is a built-in essential of Marxist doctrine, that world revolution is the real and unchanging goal of all Communists, whether they are blustering or cooing.

Marx believed that capitalism would destroy itself by wars between capitalist states and by other "contradictions." Stalin, shortly before his death, emphasized his belief in the same proposition. Now the U.S.S.R., by easing the Communist heat, is acting on a basic Marxist belief, and hoping for disunity in the non-Communist world. It may get that disunity on Korea, or on Germany, or on many another issue.

"The time of trucemaking is dangerous"--especially for those who sleep during the truce.

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