Shaky Offensive

Republican leaders had hoped to keep Defense Secretary Charles Erwin Wilson under wraps until some of the furor about his budget died down. But friends of the Air Force stirred up such a row that the Senate Appropriations Committee called Wilson well ahead of schedule last week to give him his big chance to sell his product.

In a prepared statement, Wilson went over much the same ground as did the President in his radio address. Said Wilson: "This certainly does not indicate that the Department of Defense has changed its mind regarding the importance of air power, [or] lost confidence in the Strategic Air Force . . ."

Re-examined Details. The old goal of 143 wings by June 30, 1955 could not have been reached anyway, said Wilson. The new goal of 120 wings could be reached, and with the right kind of planes. It would mean a 30% increase in the Air Force's present numerical strength and "much more" than that in combat effectiveness. While those wings were building, the Defense Department would be examining every detail to determine where the program should go from there.

When Senators probed for more details, things did not look so logical. Six times, South Carolina's Democratic Senator Burnet Maybank asked whether the U.S. is building an offensive or a defensive Air Force. It was an oversimplified question, but it had to be answered. Each time it was asked, Wilson rambled off and avoided a direct answer. Eventually, Wilson said that the U.S. force would be both offensive and defensive; then he retreated, said it would be offensive.

Maine's Republican Senator Margaret Chase Smith wanted to know who decided to cut the Air Force, and what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to do with it. After an hour of trying fruitlessly to get answers to that and another question, she handed Wilson a list of 32 written questions, tartly demanding written answers "from someone capable of supplying them." Her first question: "Is the new budget based on economy or security?"

Drastic Impact. Meanwhile, by the simple device of phoning the Air Force Liaison Office on Capitol Hill, an obscure Congressman from Los Angeles, Samuel William Yorty, got a written statement from the Air Force knocking down some of Boss Wilson's arguments.

The proposed cut, said the Air Force, would have a drastic impact on the nation's air strength. The 120-wing goal would not be reached until June 30, 1956, the year after Wilson said it would be reached. Even then, the 120 wings would have insufficient equipment and manpower. Contracts already let would have to be canceled, creating the danger that "large segments of the aircraft industry would be cut so sharply that they could not adequately respond to later aircraft orders."

After Democrat Yorty saw the first headlines, he topped his first story with a demand that Wilson resign. Said he: "We cannot afford to have the Defense Department headed by a defeatist Secretary whose vision is so circumscribed by dollars, profits, and grossly exaggerated economic strain . . ."

Nobody paid much attention to Yorty's ultimatum. But it was clear at week's end that Engine Charlie Wilson had flubbed his great opportunity to make a sale; there may be a good case for the Wilson budget, but he had not made it. The word on Capitol Hill was that, unless Wilson can do better, Congress is likely to restore $2 billion of the $5 billion Air Force cut before it passes the new Defense budget.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.