The Letter

To Dwight Eisenhower's desk, a few days before the decisive break at Panmunjom, came a powerful letter from Korea's President Syngman Rhee. The doughty old patriot objected strenuously to the latest U.S. truce plan, on which his government had not been consulted (see INTERNATIONAL). His country's hope of unity and its future safety, he warned, were imperiled; rather than accept the armistice, he vowed to lead his people in a lone fight against the Communists and in defiance of the U.N.

Rhee's stand, discounted at first, soon threatened to become the major obstacle to an armistice. Eisenhower summoned Secretary Dulles, Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins and Assistant Defense Secretary Frank C. Nash into an emergency session at the White House. A reply to Rhee was worked out. On Sunday, as General Mark Clark flew with Eisenhower's letter from Tokyo to Seoul, the White House released the text.

Clear Commitment. The latter was one of the most momentous communications ever penned by a U.S. President. It was a velvet-gloved rejection of Rhee's threat to keep fighting. It was also a catalog of benefits which would accrue to Rhee if he agreed to armistice. But over all, it was a clear U.S. commitment, Congress willing, to stand by humanitarian and political principles in Korea.

"The U.S. has stood with you, and with you we have fought for ... human freedom and political liberty," wrote Eisenhower. "[But] there cannot be independence without interdependence, and there cannot be human liberty except as men recognize that they are bound together by ties of common destiny.

"The moment has now come when we must decide whether to carry on by warfare a struggle for the unification of Korea or whether to pursue this goal by political and other methods . . . It is my profound conviction that . . . acceptance of the armistice is required of the United Nations and the Republic of Korea . . . We would not be justified in prolonging the war, with all the misery that it involves, in the hope of achieving by force the unification of Korea ..."

Political Union. Eisenhower noted that the ROK government, in alliance with the U.N., had not only denied the Communists "the fruits of aggression," but was actually in possession of more territory than it held when the war began. He assured Rhee: "The unification of Korea is an end to which the U.S. is committed." Then, in words that took in other Koreas, i.e., divided Germany and Austria, he added: "We remain determined to play our part in achieving the political union of all countries so divided . . ." But the U.S. would not "employ war as an instrument to accomplish the worldwide political settlements to which we are dedicated and which we believe to be just."

In return for Rhee's acceptance of the armistice, Eisenhower promised:

P: A U.S. policy which will make unification of Korea the "central objective" in the U.N. and in the international political conference that will follow the signing of a truce.

P: A mutual-defense treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. Eisenhower cautioned that the U.S. Senate must first approve any such treaty, added: The U.S. "investment of blood and treasure" in the Korean war is clear indication that the U.S. will not "tolerate a repetition of unprovoked aggression."

P: Economic aid to help in the rebuilding of Korea--again, Congress willing.

"The preamble of the Constitution of the U.S. states the goals of our people, which I believe are equally the goals of the brave people of Korea," Eisenhower concluded, "namely, to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty . . . With the conclusion of an armistice, the U.S. is prepared to join with the Republic of Korea to seek for Korea these ends . . . It is our desire to go forward in fellowship with the Republic of Korea. Even the thought of a separation at this critical hour would be a tragedy. We must remain united."

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