Family Get-Together

In the oblong cabinet room of 10 Downing Street, nine Prime Ministers met in solemn, smoke-filled conclave to discuss the fate of the world, so far as it can be influenced by the British Commonwealth.

It was no mean feat to maintain serenity among men of such dissimilar temperaments as India's Nehru and South Africa's Daniel Malan, but Sir Winston Churchill did it--largely by the device of doing most of the talking himself.

Each day, Sir Winston opened the discussion by giving the Churchill view of this or that aspect of world affairs. Occasionally, some other P.M. would impress himself on the others--Malan, dour and superior; Canada's St. Laurent, dry and precise; Nehru, quick and likable but with an attachment to ideology that bored some of the battered politicos around him. But it was Churchill's conference throughout. He won Commonwealth backing on four big issues:

Korea. The Commonwealth ministers warmly welcomed Churchill's announcement that peace in Korea is imminent. There was criticism of U.S. handling of negotiations, but Sir Winston, who had just returned from lunch with General George C. Marshall ("a most reasonable man"), put a stop to that with a discourse on the "difficulties" Eisenhower is having with Congress and U.S. public opinion. All present agreed that the political conference after the armistice should be confined to the Korean settlement, but equally all (save South Africa) favor Red China's admittance to the U.N.

Pacific Defense. Australia's hearty Robert Gordon Menzies, 58, made plain that ANZUS, the mutual security pact between the Australasian dominions and the U.S., ought not to be encumbered with European members. He was hopeful of a Pacific NATO, including Britain, more or less along the lines proposed by Taft.

Middle East. Churchill wants the Commonwealth to commit itself to the wartime defense of Suez, but members could not agree. Nehru and Mohammed Ali, both of whom plan to visit Egyptian Dictator Naguib on their way home from London, thought that, in Nehru's words, "progressive and controlled nationalism in the Middle East must not be thwarted." South Africa, however, worried that Russian land armies might one day storm across the Middle East and sweep through Africa, raising thousands of Mau Mau-style recruits along the way.

Big Four Conference. Churchill was convinced that the No. i objective of Soviet policy is to smash the Anglo-American alliance. As evidence, he told the P.M.s that Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik had approached him last week suggesting a Churchill-Malenkov chat as a preliminary to the Bermuda conference.

Churchill declined so transparent a gambit, but still believes that the Kremlin may want an easing of tensions. Any relaxation, Churchill granted, would be strictly "temporary." But "everything is temporary--including Malenkov."

Churchill's conclusion was that the Commonwealth as a whole should press the U.S. to agree to Big Four talks--soon. He got informal agreement, though Daniel Malan for one could see no practical advantage to be gained. Nehru was emphatic that nothing--not even U.S. abstention--should prevent a get-together with the Russians.

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