The Mekong Offensive

INDOCHINA

Communist Ho Chi Minh's order of the day was "Destroy the enemy, and achieve new feats of arms." In these terms last week the Communists launched a new major offensive in Asia. First objective: the eastern bank of the wide, fast-flowing Mekong River, fourth greatest in all Asia, and the border of Siam. Further objectives: still to unfold.

As the chill mists of the crachin season crept past the French forts of the Red River delta, elements of two Viet Minh divisions, some 20,000 strong, slipped away to the southwest; they swerved unopposed across Indo-China's wooded mountain spine, then invaded the "associated state" of Laos in its southern, least strongly defended sector (see map). The Communists fell by night upon a French-Laotian company near the border and cut it quickly to pieces. Then the invaders headed west through scraggy hillsides towards the Mekong, using footpath trails to bypass the French defense posts along the main highway. They need not have bothered: the French, hopelessly outnumbered, were already pulling out. The day after Christmas, the Communists entered the center of Thakhek (pop. 10,000) and gazed across the Mekong to the rich land of Siam. They had split Indo-China in two.

Two Theories. At this stage of the battle, Ho's military intentions are not clear. From Thakhek, he could move northwest against Luang Prabang, the Laotian royal capital; he could move south towards Savannakhet and its important nearby airfield. He could dig in at Thakhek and wait for the French to send reinforcements from the decisive delta against him. At Thakhek, too, he could pose a threat to neutral but strongly anti-Communist Siam. The Siamese were taking no chances: they declared nine provinces an emergency zone and moved troops and artillery to the Mekong, directly opposite the Communist positions.

As always with Communist actions, Ho's offensive had deeper, political purposes. Theory No. 1: Ho is now trying to win the war in a series of offensives, of which the Mekong drive is the first. Theory No. 2: Ho knows he cannot win the war unless he crushes the delta; since he cannot do this, he is therefore trying to create a position of strength in Laos as a prelude to peace negotiations.

One Conclusion. For the past three weeks, Communist capitals of Europe and Asia have been subjected to stereotyped peace rallies. Moscow, Peking and Ho have said the war could be ended by negotiation. French Premier Laniel is on record that "the French government does not consider the Indo-Chinese problem as a matter which must necessarily be settled militarily." But Ho is demanding that France 1) recognize his government and get out of Indo-China, 2) exclude Bao Dai's Vietnamese nationalists from the peace talks, 3) make the first formal move to sue for peace. All this, coupled with the challenge of the Mekong offensive, adds up to one inescapable conclusion: Ho's price is too high.

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