Waiting for Dienbienphu

A bloodstained Indo-China valley with a barely pronounceable name was transformed last week from a scratch on the map into one of the most important places in the world. At Dienbienphu, a faraway fortress overcast with gun smoke, 15,000 French troops fought a battle that could decide the fate of all Southeast Asia. Shock waves from the battle swept over Asia and Europe, endangering the French Cabinet, threatening the prospects of the European Army, menacing the unity of the Western Big Three as they prepare to meet the Big Two of Communism--Russia and China--at the Geneva Conference (April 26).

The battle itself was the fiercest and the bloodiest of the seven-year-old IndoChina war (see below). Glaring headlines and the wrench of huge casualty figures jolted the French public. Parisians by the thousands paid visits to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, under the Arc de Triomphe, and tiny bunches of violets, bought for a few francs in honor of nameless fallen Frenchmen half a world away, were deposited alongside the big formal wreaths that are nearly always there.

Hang the Consequences. A French victory at Dienbienphu would be a major setback for Ho Chi Minh, a defeat for Communists everywhere. It might also provide the kind of electric stimulus which, on occasion, makes France capable of surprising the world; at the very least, it would act as a tonic for those who insist that the war can still be won.

But far greater than the good victory could do was the harm that defeat would wreak on the French spirit. Most politicians have already succumbed to the belief that the Indo-China war cannot be won on the field, that it must be ended by negotiation. The French feel trapped in a "heads-you-win, tails-we-lose" position. If Dienbienphu stands fast (as seemed highly possible this week), the price of victory would likely strengthen the voices of those who believe that the Indo-China war costs more than it is worth. Should the fortress fall, there would almost certainly be a massive public outcry to end the war. and hang the consequences. Either way, France is painfully close to wanting an armistice at almost any price.

Global Package Deal. It was that mood which linked Dienbienphu with the political battlefields of Europe. Soviet Russia has been hinting at the price that it and Red China might demand for an end to the Indo-Chinese fighting. Items: I) Western recognition of Red China's "legitimate place," 2) an end to the cold-war limitations on East-West trade, and 3) by implication if not outright demand, a refusal by France to go ahead with the EDC.

Hagridden by fear of Germany, influenced by Molotov's propaganda bluff that EDC "cannot fail to lead to World War III," more and more Frenchmen are attracted by the notion of a global package deal: a cease-fire in Indo-China for rejection of EDC. Jacques Soustelle, a power in the Gaullist party, said last week: "If France should obtain a cessation of hostilities and, at the same time, reject EDC, she would gain at both tables."

So far, the Laniel Cabinet has rejected this defeatist notion, for it would mean giving way to the Reds in both Europe and Asia. But the government still refuses to set a date for the French debate on EDC; it insists first on getting at least three things from the allies: I) settlement of the Saar dispute with Germany, 2) assurances that the U.S. will keep troops on the Continent, and 3) a close British association with the EDC.

Surviving on Knife-Edge. British and Americans were trying last week to half-push, half-cajole the Laniel government to the decision on EDC by promising that the assurances will be forthcoming, but refusing officially to deliver them until Laniel schedules a debate. Laniel, a stubborn Norman who is now bemused by the desire to survive on the knife-edge of the premiership as long as possible, budged so little that last week some of the most influential Americans in Paris de spaired out loud of getting a date set before the diplomats gather at Geneva.

The setting of a date would not in itself assure French approval of EDC, but it would represent a commitment that would remove EDC as a bargaining item. If it is not set, France's allies fear that Commu nist divisive maneuvers at Geneva may build French delay into outright scuttling of the European Army plan. What France decides to do hinges cruelly on the verdict finally reached in the smoke of Dienbienphu.

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