Monday, Apr. 05, 1954
Policy for Indo-China
After weeks of intense behind-scenes discussion in Washington, the U.S. firmly made up its mind about Indo-China, and this week Secretary of State Dulles spoke it. The U.S. does not intend to accept a Communist victory in Indo-China, he said. The U.S. feels that the threat should be met with "united action," even though "this might involve serious risks." And if Red China sends "its own army into Indo-China, the grave consequences might not be confined to Indo-China."
Dulles spoke in Manhattan to the Overseas Press Club of America, but rarely has a speech been so deliberately beamed across both oceans. He was, in effect, staking out a U.S. position prior to the Geneva Conference between the Big Four and Communist China late this month.
And he was talking not only to Peking and Moscow, but to London and Paris, where pressure for an Indo-China truce and an Asian "settlement" is strong.
In Indo-China, "international Communism" is trying to gain "a stranglehold on the people," said Dulles, and its agent is Moscow-trained Ho Chi Minh. Ho's armies "are supplied with artillery and ammunition . . . much of it fabricated by the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia and transported across Russia and Siberia, and then down through China to Viet Nam . . .
"The propagandists of Red China and Russia make it apparent that their purpose is to dominate all of Southeast Asia . . . the so-called 'rice bowl' which helps to feed the densely populated region that extends from India to Japan. It is rich in many raw materials such as tin, oil, rubber and iron ore [and lies] astride the most direct and best-developed sea and air routes between the Pacific and South Asia. It has major naval and air bases.
"Communist control of Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, with whom we have treaties of mutual assistance. The entire West Pacific area, including the so-called 'offshore island chain,' would be strategically endangered."
Turning to the subject of Red China, Dulles drove down a few more important stakes. The U.S., he said: P: Does not intend to recognize Communist China because "diplomatic recognition is a voluntary act," and Communist China "has been consistently and viciously hostile to the U.S." P: Opposes the admission of Communist China to the United Nations because it is a "regime which is a convicted aggressor, which . . . continues to promote the use of force in violation of the principles of the United Nations."
P: Intends to discuss only Korea and Indo-China with Red China at Geneva, hopes Geneva will bring Peking to cease and desist its design for conquest, but does not intend to "give Communist China what it wants from us, merely in exchange for promises of future good behavior."
P: Intends to stand by "the National government of China" on Formosa, "loyal friends and allies when, during World War II, we needed each other."
"In Europe," Dulles concluded, "Soviet Russia holds its grip on Eastern Germany and upon Austria and maneuvers recklessly to prevent reconciliation between Germany and France. In Asia, the whole area from Japan and Korea to Southeast Asia is troubled by Communist efforts at penetration . . . There is only one defense--a defense compounded of eternal vigilance, sound policies and high courage. The U.S. is a member of a goodly company who have in the past stood together in the face of great peril and have overcome it. If we are true to that past, we can face the future with hope and confidence."
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