Monday, May. 10, 1954

The Marines Decide

When the call came at last, Colonel Frank H. Schwable, U.S.M.C., was wearing casual civvies at home. He had waited a long time for the verdict; it had been six weeks since the Navy court of inquiry got the last of the testimony and more than a year since the winter of 1952-53 when the Chinese Reds broke Annapolis-man Schwable to their will.

Schwable dashed about the house getting his uniform together. He looked fit again; he had been working around the house, had put a fence around the yard. His cheeks were filled out, and the haunted look had left his eyes.

Resplendent in his uniform, with gold wings and four rows of ribbons, he looked the very picture of the distinguished career officer as he stepped into Marine Corps headquarters for the verdict. Minutes later he knew that, while cleared of all charges, his career as a combat commander was over.

The Treatment. As a prisoner of war in North Korea, Colonel Schwable "confessed" to the U.S. use of germ warfare, a monstrous lie which Red propaganda sent around the world. He had been incessantly bullied and mentally tortured until -helpless, half-frozen and sick-he cracked. "Any man can be broken down eventually, one way or another, heroics notwithstanding," he said in explanation.

The court-three Marine generals (including a Medal of Honor winner and an expert on military law) and a top Navy surgeon-agreed. Schwable was exonerated completely because he "resisted this torture to the limit of his ability to resist." His treatment "constituted reason able justification," the court found, recommending that "no disciplinary action be taken."

The court added a sweeping generalization: under Communist torture "one of three events inevitably takes place: i) the victim's will to resist is broken, and he responds as the enemy desires; 2) the victim becomes insane; 3) the victim dies."

The court called on the Defense Department to prepare a new rule of conduct for Americans who may some day, as prisoners, be called on to face the Red treatment. In a lengthy comment, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, the Corps commandant, did not quarrel with the court's finding in the individual case of Colonel Schwable. but he did attack the court's amazing generalization that under Red torture all prisoners must either confess or go mad or die. In Korea, there were many cases of tortured prisoners who did none of these. Said Shepherd: "Some found the strength in religious faith; a few possessed the toughness of fiber needed to defy their captors' every demand."

General Shepherd considered the court's recommendation that Red torture tactics called for a study of some new instructions to servicemen to replace the order that prisoners give no information other than name, rank and serial number.

One by one. Shepherd ticked off and rejected some recently suggested alternatives:

P:That prisoners tell all they know because "the average prisoner has nothing of importance to tell." Actually, said Shepherd, vital intelligence comes from "the painstaking creation of a related mosaic of fact created out of fragments of seemingly unimportant information gleaned from the patient questioning of thousands of captives." In effect, any information can help the enemy.

Cf That prisoners tell anything "already known to the enemy." Shepherd declared that it would be "far beyond the competence of the average prisoner" to be able to tell what the enemy knew. <) That prisoners "offer false information as a means of placating their captors and avoiding punishment." Answered Shepherd: "Established military intelligence techniques of every nation embrace means to recognize and refute deception in any form." He noted that both Colonel

Schwable and the Army's famed Major General William F. Dean "attempted it only to have their carefully considered stories completely and quickly refuted by their captors . . . The collapse of Colonel Schwable's moral resistance began . . . with proof of the falsity of his original account. From then on, he was continually on the defensive, and successfully deprived of any element of moral ascendancy."

The Best Safeguard. Based on the experience in Korea, Shepherd decided that "the best safeguard," both for prisoners themselves and for the national interest, is to give no more than name, rank and serial number. He noted nevertheless that in Korea "those seemed to have fared best who talked the least."

"In the struggle against Communism, the war is no longer over when men are forced to yield . . . They must be taught to carry on an unequal struggle with the only weapons remaining to them-faith and courage."

In the court's verdict and General Shepherd's comment, the Marines became the first of the services to deal with the problems raised by Red torture.

Each individual case of a prisoner who cracks will be dealt with on its merits. But the rule cannot be relaxed. To do so would only invite more Communist torture of prisoners.

In Schwable case, there was a further question: Could the Marines give combat command in the future to a career officer who had cracked? Could it expect him to give his men the kind of leadership the Marines demand? The commandant's answer : Colonel Schwable henceforth should be assigned only "duties of a type making minimum demands . . . upon the elements of unblemished personal example and leadership."

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