American Style

INDOCHINA

In Indo-China, at last something was stirring. The Americans had long advocated it; the French, though skeptical, were about ready to let the Americans try it. The plan: U.S. Army instructors would train a big, new Vietnamese army, starting some time this summer, as they had once trained the South Koreans and the Greeks. The objective: five new Vietnamese divisions ready for action this year; four more Vietnamese, one Laotian and three Cambodian divisions ready by mid-1955.

Uncertain Performance. There were already 420,000 Vietnamese under arms--230,000 with the Vietnamese National Army, 100,000 with the French Union Army, 70,000 with the militia, plus 20,000 irregulars. These Vietnamese had fought well enough from time to time (e.g., Dienbienphu, Seno), but they were clearly no match for the regulars of the Red Viet Minh. Disillusioned by Dienbienphu and fearful that they would be sold out at Geneva, the Vietnamese were now losing outposts at the rate of three or four a day, especially in "quiet" South Viet Nam; they were losing 200 rifles a month in one province without a single engagement; their public support had so dwindled that only 10,000 responded to last month's "emergency" 100,000-man draft.

The Vietnamese army's uncertain performance reflected the basic uncertainties of Indo-China. but there were many who argued that 1) the Vietnamese would fight effectively if they had independence to fight for, 2) the French had never really given the Vietnamese army a chance. The French had blocked formation of the Vietnamese army until 1951--five years after the war began; they had denied the Vietnamese a sizable share of modern U.S. equipment and financial aid; they had played down Vietnamese exploits in the GHQ communiques. The French had also deliberately hamstrung the young army by training only companies and battalions at a time, by scattering these units piecemeal across Indo-China under French command and by holding back the training of Vietnamese officers. (There are today only 7,500 trained Vietnamese officers, when at least 20,000 are needed.) Offensive Action.

When the U.S. offered to take over the Vietnamese-army training last fall. French Commanding General Navarre denounced such interference. Navarre's successor, General Ely, is now quite agreeable to a U.S. training program under his own overall command. The U.S. plan, worked out by Major General John ("Iron Mike") O'Daniel, head of the U.S. Military Advisory Group:

P: Reorganize the Vietnamese army into mobile 10,000-to 12,000-man divisions, with Vietnamese commanders. "We want to train these men for offensive action," said one U.S. officer. "We're not interested in training them to go back to their pillboxes."

P: Bring at least 3,000 U.S. Army officers and noncoms into Indo-China within the next twelve months to supervise four new Vietnamese training centers, to run two of them on their own and to accompany the newly trained Vietnamese divisions into battle, Korea-style, right down to the regimental level.

There is and probably will continue to be a basic divergence of aims between the Americans and the French, but the plan is compatible with both: the U.S. hopes with these troops to win the war: the French believe the new Vietnamese divisions may he useful to shore up the French bargaining position to get a better negotiated peace. Final agreement on details is expected in Saigon within the next two weeks.

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