Back to Rapallo?

Since coming to power in 1949, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer has kept his people's eyes turned firmly westward. He sold them on the theory that Germany's future depends on the building of a strong Western Europe. "Europe is coming," Der Alte promised week after week. Last week, as it became increasingly plain that Europe is not coming, Adenauer faced outspoken rumbles among his own supporters.

The first murmurs began after the failure of the Berlin Conference to agree to a united Germany. Dr. Thomas Dehler, chairman of the Free Democrats, No. 2 party in the Adenauer coalition, asked pointedly: "Is it not necessary to enter into conversations with the rulers in Moscow and Peking?" Adenauer shushed him by calling such talk appeasement. But after target dates for EDC ratification by the French came & went without action, and the French government tottered feebly, the mutters in Germany increased. The German Chancellor's policy, said the critics, had gotten his nation nothing from either West or East. German businessmen, their production lines overflowing, lusted for Eastern outlets.

Duesseldorf Talk. Last week the debate came out in the open. Two influential voices expressed their misgivings publicly. Before Duesseldorf's Rhein-Ruhr Club, Heinrich Bruning, last democratic Chancellor of the Weimar Republic (1930-32) and now a professor at Cologne University, warned that Adenauer's policy was inflexible and unrealistic. Germany, he said, must return to its traditional Rapallo-Locarno policy of friendship with both East and West. Through the Treaties of Rapallo (allying Germany with Russia in 1922) and Locarno (allying her with the West in 1925), Germany had risen from the ashes of World War I. A new Rapallo-Locarno policy would again enable Germany to play the two power blocs off against each other, and reap rewards from both. Adenauer was "too dogmatic" and he was also too dependent on the U.S., which Herr Professor Bruening said gloomily, is headed for an economic slump.* Then up stood old Hans Luther, another pre-Hitler Chancellor (1925-26) and one-time Ambassador to the U.S. He agreed with Bruening. Through an aroma of fragrant cigars, West Germany's bankers and businessmen nodded slowly.

The Rhein-Ruhr Club is the managerial backbone of German industry. Adenauer could not afford to lose such support.

"It is regrettable," Der Alte cried, "that men of such excellent reputation are making remarks which might be harmful." He asserted that the Russians had deliberately exaggerated Germany's potential market in the U.S.S.R. He hit Bruening's "seesaw policy" as unsuitable, and as tending to create "distrust in Germany's reliability." Bruning hastily said that he had not meant his remarks to be publicized.

Moscow Hint. The Russians did not let the debate die. Pravda quoted Premier Malenkov as promising that the Kremlin would "treat favorably" any West German approach. Dr. Dehler, boss of the Free Democrats, spoke up again last week: "Direct diplomatic relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union are absolutely necessary." A third party in Adenauer's coalition, the German Party, chimed in, demanding "full freedom of action" for Germany.

In Bonn, Der Alte, who has frequently said that 1954 is the year of decision for Germany, fought to put down the revolt before it became dangerous. He badly needed help from his allies, and was not getting it.

* Bruening spent the years 1935-51 in the U.S., during which time he taught government at Harvard University.

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