The Deadline

Right up to the last minute of the last hour, France's energetic little Premier Pierre Mendes-France was determined not to lose his nerve. He expected trouble, and got it. "They will keep up the war of nerves until the end," he predicted, "perhaps until half an hour before midnight Tuesday, reckoning I shall weaken under pressure."

But the hand of time lay on the Communists, too--as Mendes-France had planned it should. They could destroy him, and knew it. He left no doubt that he would carry out his pledge of resignation if there was no cease-fire by July 20. His very effectiveness, as a man who held promise of giving France firm leadership, might well make the Communists decide that here was a man they would do well to destroy. They did not lack pretexts. But if they failed to accept peace from a man pledged to give them peace, they risked alienating India and the Asian countries which still had their illusions about Communist good faith. And, in turning on Mendes-France, they might face an aroused France and a renewal of war in Indo-China.

Blunt Man. In the last busy week, Mendes' first concern was to strengthen his own hand. He cajoled John Foster Dulles as far as Paris, made a hectic flying visit from Geneva to Paris (accompanied by Britain's admiring Anthony Eden) to meet him. Mendes did not stand on protocol. He rushed right over to the U.S. embassy to see Dulles. He wanted to make it clear that he was not a "peace-at-any-price" man.

Mendes was blunt. He told Dulles that France had lost the war in Indo-China. Since neither the U.S. nor Britain was willing to intervene with ground forces to alter that fact, he felt that his allies should support him in getting the best settlement that he could. If the U.S. stayed away, he told Dulles, the Communists would conclude that the U.S. had deserted France, and would demand stiffer terms than he could accept. If no settlement was reached, all the world would blame the U.S.

Dulles was impressed with the position, and the man. After 24 hours of hectic and earnest talk, Mendes returned to Geneva with Dulles' promise to send Bedell Smith back to Geneva.

Mendes plunged ahead with a new confidence. Before, he had let it be known that he would consider partition of Viet Nam at the 16th parallel (the Communists demanded the 14th). But on his return, he proposed division at the 18th (see map, p. 22), which is 140 miles to the north of his first boundary. "The American signature is surely worth a parallel or two," he told Viet Minh Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong cheerfully.

The 18th parallel would save Tourane, some vital air bases, and the only free road to Laos from the sea. As compensation, he was willing to give the Communists an enclave south of the 18th, but wanted a bridgehead at Haiphong (he had no hope of holding Hanoi).

All day long, visitors streamed to Mendes' villa six miles outside Geneva. He set up his desk in the garden, received visitors singly without an aide and, when possible, without an interpreter, glancing at his watch as he talked. Thursday night Mendes invited Molotov to dinner. After the meal the two men went out alone into the garden, where a huge map of Indo-China was spread on a table. Their advisers were left behind in the house; only two interpreters stood by.

By Lamplight. The two men leaned over the table, their faces lit eerily by a red-shaded lamp planted on the map. While Soviet secret service men padded invisibly at the bottom of the dark garden, the two men talked grimly until 1:30 a.m. Molotov's cigarette glowed angrily. Neither gave an inch. Molotov said the Viet Minh territory should extend to the 14th parallel because "their soldiers can take that much." He sneered at suggestions that the French should keep Haiphong. Elections must be held within three months of a cease-fire--"that is, if we are talking as true democrats."

In that session, Mendes came to know the Molotov whom more experienced Western diplomats have come to know and hate. Temporarily, Mendes showed his first signs of depression. But next day, he was hustling again. He talked with China's Chou Enlai, won a tentative concession from Molotov to delay elections one year after a ceasefire.

Mendes had put the problem up to the Communists before the eyes of the whole world. By bringing Smith back to Geneva, by demonstrating to the world France's willingness to compromise, he had forced the onus of refusal clearly on the Communists. "Nothing which separates us now is either obscure or insurmountable," he told the French people in a "corner of the hearth" broadcast at week's end. "It is a question of will."

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