A Dreadful Price

A somber stillness dropped over the paddies of Tonkin, and an anxious peace settled over the world. For the first time in almost a quarter of a century,*there was no large-scale war on the planet. But it was a tenuous peace, bought at a dreadful price.

At Geneva the Communists got precisely what they sought: a vast slice of Indo-China, and a stance from which to take the rest, plus formal recognition of their military conquests and time to do their further will. In the closing hours at Geneva, it was apparent that the Communists wanted peace as desperately as France (see FOREIGN NEWS). Now Red China had time--time to consolidate her dominance of the Asian continent, time (as a "peace-loving nation") to press for membership in the United Nations, and, above all, time to turn to the final suppression of the Chinese people themselves.

With Knowledge of Folly. For the free world, the settlement legitimized a crushing defeat already suffered. Through spirited bargaining, France's Premier Pierre Mendes-France kept his hold on a few degrees of latitude across Viet Nam's waist, won a few extra months of respite for free Viet Nam. But these were no more than bargaining old bones, tossed to the West by the Communists to get a deal. If the Reds swallowed only part of Viet Nam now, they could afford to wait for the rest. By the swapping of a few parallels, and the concession of a few months, they gained immeasurable prestige for their unexpected "generosity." In Asia the balance of power was swinging to the Reds; in Europe the Communist dove of peace flew high. Inevitably, the settlement was compared with the "peace" at Munich in 1938. This peace was different; it was a surrender after defeat in battle. But in a sense, it was worse, for it was negotiated with full knowledge of the folly of Munich.

The ominous challenge to the foreign policy and world leadership of the U.S. was not among the articles laid down on paper in the Geneva agreement, but it was a stark reality. By its wavering indecision--unable to stand aloof, unwilling to go all-out in another "little war"--the U.S. had contributed to the defeat. "I will not be a party to any agreement that makes anybody a slave," said President Eisenhower emphatically on June 30. But three weeks later, the U.S. had to stand with the rest of the West, take note of a truce that would make slaves of 12 million Vietnamese.

The President, a weathered veteran of military and diplomatic wars and skirmishes, recognized the extent of the defeat and the degree of the danger. "The United States has not been a belligerent in this war," he said. "The primary responsibility for the settlement in IndoChina rested with those nations which participated in the fighting. Our role at Geneva has been at all times to try to be helpful . . . The agreement contains features which we do not like." Then, with an eye to the next Red move, he added, "but a great deal depends on how they work out in practice."

With Cambodian Resolution. The President did not have long to wait. Before the Geneva agreement was fully ratified last week, the Communists were trumpeting for a new Big Four conference (with Red China as an invited kibitzer) to discuss European security and settle the problem of German unification. Said the Russian invitation: "The Geneva Conference has shown that powerful discussion between interested states under definite conditions can lead to agreements which answer to the interests of people who are striving for peace and security."

To Washington, where the "definite conditions" of the Communists are well known, the proposed conference was an old familiar refrain: the Russians fearful of EDC and a rearmed Germany, were seeking to lull and neutralize free Europe and to partition the Western alliance as they had partitioned Indo-China. U.S. reaction to the proposal would almost certainly be a flat no. But in Europe, haunted by the nightmare of thermonuclear war, there has been an alarming response to the Russian lullaby in recent months. Socialists, liberals, ordinary citizens--and even Winston Churchill--seemed to think that another conference might be the proper path to peace. For the U.S. the next few months would be a time of crisis. At Geneva tiny Cambodia, with its successful last-minute demands, had demonstrated to the world that the Communists are not irresistible, that stubborn courage still counts. With such resolution the U.S. could still reclaim its leadership and restore the unity and strength of the Western alliance. Already, U.S. diplomats were working on a new bulwark in Asia (see below). But, as of last week, the U.S. had no coherent, long-range plan to stop the Communists.

*Since Sept. 18, 1931, when the Japanese began

fighting in Manchuria.

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