Filling the Vacuum

Two flying diplomats went to Europe's rescue last week. Each after his fashion, Britain's Anthony Eden and the U.S.'s John Foster Dulles sought a means of filling the vacuum left by the defeat of EDC.

The initiative came from Eden, who, with one aide and one briefcase, flew to Brussels, Bonn, Rome and Paris. Only in Paris did he run into serious trouble.

Eden bore a clever plan, a characteristically British blend of something old and something new. Part I was a dust-covered document: the 1948 Brussels treaty, in which Britain, France and the Benelux countries agreed, in the event of outside attack, to provide "all the military . . . assistance in their power." Originally aimed at the Germans, the Brussels treaty became the first European alliance against Soviet imperialism. Last week the British revived it, proposing that the Brussels pact's references to German militarism be deleted and the treaty extended to include a rearmed Germany and Italy.

Part II of the Eden plan called for the return of German sovereignty and for speedy German rearmament under NATO control. To sweeten this for the French, Germany would accept restrictions on the size of its army; to make it palatable to the Germans (too powerful to be discriminated against any longer), similar restrictions would be applied to all. As Eden explained it, the West Germans, who have no overseas responsibilities, would commit the whole of their new army to NATO, whereas Britain, France and the U.S. would commit only their European contingents, thus keeping complete control of their own troops outside Europe. NATO would then set common "force levels."

Problems in Paris. The Eden plan had something for everyone. It would leave sovereignties intact but still link the Germans to the West in a European context. The French would be relieved to see Britain moving more closely to the Continent, but Englishmen need not fear, since the principle that Britain should not be more deeply committed to the Continent than the U.S. is would still be inviolate.

Premier Mends-France, over brandy and cigars, told Eden that he was prepared "en principe" to try the British plan. France would accept eventual German admission to NATO--but only under adequate controls. The question was: Who would be responsible for making the controls stick? Eden's choice was NATO, where the Americans too would be involved. But Mendes-France fears that the U.S. has little desire to check the Germans. So he wanted the job entrusted to the Brussels powers, all of whom bear the teethmarks of German aggression.

Eden returned to London, disturbed by Mendes' proposals (which he regarded as cumbersome), but convinced that there was plenty of "give" in the French position. Before leaving Paris, he got news that John Foster Dulles, just back from Asia, was winging his way to Europe.

Flying State Department. With very little advance warning, Dulles dropped in at Bonn with a miniature State Department in tow. He promptly went into conclave with Konrad Adenauer, spent most of the time asking questions about Eden's visit. Dulles found that Eden had 1) persuaded the Germans to stop antagonizing the French by loud demands for absolute sovereignty, 2) discouraged Adenauer's yearning for supranational solutions. Dulles instead encouraged Bonn to be as assertive as it likes about Germany's rights. A joint communique first urged "full equality" for West Germany and "sovereignty . . . with all speed," then harked back to "the great goal" of European integration--along EDC lines. Said a puzzled Bonn observer: "If the State Department can't bring itself to realize that EDC is dead, they should at least refrain from feeding German illusions."

The Bonn communique omitted any mention of France. This was deliberate, since Dulles wanted to emphasize that the U.S. intends to lean more and more on Germany, less and less on France. Dulles also refused to visit Paris on the grounds that he didn't have time. The French were outraged, as Dulles apparently intended that they should be. At week's end, overriding some of his advisers, Konrad Adenauer followed Dulles' lead by refusing to attend a Council of Europe session in Strasbourg, at which Premier Mendes-France was to outline his ideas on German rearmament.

Meeting of Stars. At week's end Dulles and Eden met in London to compare notes. In a prepared statement at London Airport, Dulles said: "We in the U.S. greatly admire the initiative and vigor which Mr. Eden has shown . . ." Dulles listened carefully to what Eden had to report on the French attitude, but was considerably less optimistic than the British that Mendes-France would come around. With little enthusiasm, the U.S. agreed to a nine-power meeting next week in London (the six EDC originals, plus Britain, the U.S. and Canada). Then Mendes-France would have a chance to prove whether British trust or U.S. doubt is the more justified.

From Brussels itself came another prod to Mendes-France. Belgium's Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak warned that unless the Germans rearm, the U.S. is likely to withdraw its forces from the Continent, and Britain would follow suit, making "the defense of Europe impossible."

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