The Russo-Chinese Pact

From Peking and Moscow one day last week, the Communist radio trumpeted the news of "the seven accords" between the old and the new giants of Communism. The accords were clothed in cliches: "The negotiations took place in an atmosphere of sincere friendship." In bombast: "The continued occupation by the U.S. of [Formosa] ... is incompatible with peace in the Far East." In sweet talk: "The Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic will continue to build their relations with . . . other countries on the basis of a strict observance of ... territorial integrity."

Underneath, the accords wore the look of deep cooperation between Moscow and Peking. Most of the points were Russian concessions. The Russians agreed: P: To evacuate their ice-free Manchurian naval base at Port Arthur (pop. 142,000) by the end of next May, thereby ending a ten-year military occupation. P: To extend another $130 million in long-term credits to Peking. P: To sell back (for easy payments of Chinese exports) their share of four joint Soviet-Chinese companies in Red China now that the Chinese "can themselves manage the activity of enterprises." This was on the surface a major concession. Joint companies are the standard Soviet devices for establishing control of satellite economies. Two of the companies had clamped a Soviet hold on the exploitation of Sinkiang's oil and mineral resources. P: To help Red China set up 15 new heavy industrial projects, build two railroads out from Central China to the Russian border.

The Russians also joined, at least with moral support, in Red China's campaign against Formosa--while carefully avoiding any outright commitment to support any Red Chinese invasion. The two Red partners also used the occasion to woo Japan, urged the Japanese to "liberate" themselves from the U.S. Significantly, the accords totally transformed the status of Japan in Communist eyes. Before, Japan had been portrayed as an "aggressive threat and tool" of the American imperialists, and used as a pretext for the need for Russian troops in Port Arthur. In the accords. Japan was transformed to a "victim" of U.S. occupation.

Equality? In military terms, the agreement had little meaning: after next May 31 the Russians would still enjoy "joint use" of the Port Arthur base with their good friends of Red China. In any event, the Russians had the use of a second ice-free port at Dairen, a handy 25 miles up the Liao Tung peninsula from Pert Arthur. But the agreements let Peking spread the impression that it had been able to force the Russians to withdraw.

Westerners could only guess what inspired the accords. Some speculated that Russia had been forced to grant concessions to keep rambunctious Red China in line. Others speculated that Russia and Red China were moving more closely together, that the best opportunities for world revolution lay in Asia and that Red China was to be allowed, encouraged and built up to lead it.

Boost in Prestige. Whatever the Russian motives, the agreement was a great new boost for Red China's prestige: Mao Tse-tung and Co. could henceforth stand before their own discontented peoples and their impressionable neighbors as Asians who had proved strong enough to negotiate their big Russian brothers and profit. On the other hand, the Russian Communists were also cleverly boosting their own prestige in Asia, giving new impetus to their new campaign to prove themselves reasonable folk who could be lived with.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.