Decision & Danger

(See Cover)

It was New Year's on Formosa, the beginning of the Year of the Sheep. All last week, places of business, including the newspapers, were closed in observance of the holiday. Along the streets of Taipei (pop. 500,000) firecrackers popped among the red-brick buildings from dawn until dusk. Pedicab coolies in conical straw hats and straw raincoats lounged by their carriages, inspecting their bare toes as they waited to take Formosan families on New Year's calls. A soft fog ringed the lush, green hills, throwing a grey blanket over the palms, the camphor trees and the sweet-potato patches.

Thirty-two miles to the northeast, at the harbor city of Keelung (pop. 150,000), the 13,600-ton cruiser Helena, flagship of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, lay at anchor. Aboard the Helena, the atmosphere seemed as cheerful as that ashore. The fleet's commander, a quiet, three-star admiral named Alfred Melville Pride, one of a long line of seafaring Prides (see box), went about his daily routine with casual efficiency. The mood aboard ship was one of unruffled waiting. Vice Admiral Pride and his topflight staff had events well enough in hand so that he could tip back in his chair, grin and crack: "Everybody's heaving around, and the admiral hasn't a thing to do.""

Beneath the calm on Formosa and the studied casualness on the Helena was the knowledge that the land and the ship and the fleet lay in the core of a diplomatic tornado that was swirling around the world. Two hundred and fifty miles away, the mangled bodies of Chinese Nationalists killed in the Communist Chinese attack on the islet of Yikiang were tossed ashore by the turbulent waters of the East China Sea. There was little calm, outward or inward, in Washington or in London or in the United Nations headquarters at New York. In the world's capitals, last week was recognized as a time of decision and danger.

"Clearly & Publicly." The week of decision began when clerks in the U.S. House and Senate stood up to read a special message from President Eisenhower. Chinese Communist attacks on Nationalist-held islands off the coast of China, said the President, were seriously imperiling the peace and security of the world. He asked Congress to "clearly and publicly establish the authority of the President" to use U.S. forces as he deems necessary for the protection of Formosa and the Pescadores. He wanted that authority to be broad enough to cover defense of "related territories."

There was hardly a lawmaker on Capitol Hill who thought that Dwight Eisenhower needed to ask for that authority; he already had it. But the President knew that the action he was about to propose could, although he did not believe it would, lead to a large-scale war. He wanted to demonstrate national unity behind his policy; he wanted to keep his 1952 campaign promise that he would submit to Congress any proposed steps to use U.S. forces in combat.

On the Democratic side of the aisle, there was many a misgiving about endorsing, in advance, the foreign policy of a Republican President. Across the aisle, some Republicans were fearful (as were some Democrats) that the resolution might bring the U.S. closer to war, and others thought it might be a move toward appeasement. But. in the end, the Congress gave the President what he wanted by an almost unanimous vote.

"The Vile Octopus." In the House the Foreign Affairs Committee approved the resolution within five hours after it was introduced; the House itself passed it by 409-3 after less than three hours' debate.

The clearest case for a firm stand in the Far East was made by South Carolina's Representative James P. Richards, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Said Democrat Richards: "If we, with all our power, and removed by distance, waver, if we talk further about settlements and truces with the Communists, we cannot expect the small nations living in the long shadow of the vile Communist octopus to stand up to them. The firm and uncompromising position we take today will do much to renew their faith in what we stand for...Will the choice for us or the issues before us be any clearer in six months or in twelve months or in two years? I think we have reached the dividing line where doubt must end and decision begin."

In the Senate, Mavericks Wayne Morse of Oregon and William Langer of North Dakota, with the help of New York Democrat Herbert Lehman, raised the cry of "aggression." Said Morse: the resolution implied that the U.S. would attack the Chinese mainland if the Communists were staging there for attacks on Formosa; this was authority for "preventive war." In this situation, Morse feared, some "trigger-happy" military men might touch off World War III. (This charge brought a guffaw when it was read by Admiral Pride's men in the wardroom of the Helena. Said an aide of the quiet, careful admiral: "If there's one thing that doesn't describe the Old Man, it's 'trigger-happy.")

One Man's Authority. When Morse's words reached the White House, Dwight Eisenhower decided it was time to reply. He called Georgia's Senator Walter George, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, on the telephone. The President said that he was about to issue a statement, and he wanted to read it to George first. A few moments later the White House released the word: "The President made it clear [at a conference with his defense officials] that these [the U.S.] forces were designed purely for defensive purposes, and that any decision to use U.S. forces other than in immediate self-defense or in direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores would be a decision which he [the President] would take, and the responsibility for which he has not delegated." Old (77 last week) Democrat George read the Republican President's statement on the floor of the Senate, and made the hardest plea for what Dwight Eisenhower wanted:

"What does the statement say?" asked George. "It says that Chiang Kai-shek will not make the decision...It means that no admiral here and no line officer off the coast of China, in the Formosa Straits or elsewhere, will start it. It means, in explicit terms, that the decision will be made here, that it will be a personal decision of the President of the U.S....God keep us out of war, but if war must come, let us not draw a line and say that beyond that line is a sanctuary which the enemy may occupy...We would be the laughingstock of mankind if we said we would not interfere until we saw the en-my actually putting his foot on the shore of Formosa."

After about 26 hours of debate and after turning down a series of limiting amendments, the Senate passed the resolution 85-3. Only Morse, Langer and Lehman voted nay. Many of the 85 Senators still had deep doubts, but their position was aptly summed up by Maine's Republican Senator Margaret Chase Smith. Said she: "The situation is such that we do not have the luxury of freedom of choice in this matter . . . The circumstances do not permit us the liberty to differ with the President on this resolution. For if we did, and the resolution were defeated, we would give the impression to the rest of the world that we did not have the will to resist Communist aggression."

One Nation's Unity. For Dwight Eisenhower, the week's events were a demonstration of forceful and skillful presidential leadership. He had used his prestige to score a political and policy victory, had placed Capitol Hill--its Republicans and Democrats alike--in the position of sharing the decision.

Said the President as he signed the resolution: "By their vote, the American people, through their elected representatives, have made it clear to the world that we are united here at home in our determination to help a brave ally and to resist Communist armed aggression. By so asserting this belief, we are taking a step to preserve the peace in the Formosa area. We are ready to support a United Nations effort to end present hostilities in the area, but we are also united in our determination to defend an area vital to the security of the United States and the free world."

Two Plus, Two Minus. This week's action by the President and Congress had four elements:

1) More strongly than ever before the U.S. had guaranteed Formosa and the Pescadores against Communist invasion.

2) The self-imposed limitation on the scope of defensive action, fatal to the hope of victory in Korea, would no longer apply in the Formosa area; in the event of Red attack, the U.S. would pursue the enemy by air into the mainland.

3) The Tachens would be evacuated.

4) By discussing a cease-fire and putting his whole emphasis on the defense of Formosa, the President implicitly abandoned Formosa as a threat to the Chinese mainland.

In the long run, the fourth point might turn out to be the most important, because potentially it represents a relaxation of pressure against Red China, whose Red masters need Formosa far less than they need the new freedom that the neutralization of Formosa will give them. Opposite Formosa the Reds have had to station hundreds of thousands of troops. If they now conclude that the U.S. has chained Chiang, they can redeploy these troops for other fields of aggression or they can demobilize them, thus relieving strain on the sagging Red economy.

But these long-range factors were not the immediate concern of Admiral Mel Pride and his Seventh Fleet: their first task was to prepare for the evacuation of the Tachen Islands.

The Calculated Risk. These barren rocks, only 25 miles from the mainland, 250 miles from Formosa, have been occupied by 12,000 Nationalist troops and 15,000 civilians. They are within easy striking distance of the Communist airfields in the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo area; the mileage makes them difficult to protect with air power from Formosa. They have no airfields of their own.

On Admiral Pride's flagship, anchored at Keelung last week, a dozen officers were working cheek by jowl in the ship's Plans Room, a 12-by-20-ft. midship hotbox lined with steampipes. The details of their work were so secret that even the Kleenex they used (for winter colds) was immediately burned. Their project: planning the evacuation of the Tachens by Chinese Nationalist and U.S. ships.

Under the plans Pride's men were drawing, the U.S. Navy will run small amphibious craft into the beaches on the Tachens, and Navymen will go ashore in landing parties. They will bring evacuees out to Nationalist and U.S. ships in as few swoops as possible. While the process goes on, the Seventh Fleet and its air cover will patrol the area.

Involved in this plan is the calculated risk that the Communists may attack the evacuating units of the fleet. The attack could come from Chinese Communist planes, or from Russian-made PT boats, or submarines. If this happens, Admiral Pride will strike back at the Red craft and their bases. There will be no sanctuary. "To be frank," said Pride, "we do feel pretty well-organized and competent to carry out our mission here. We feel that we can handle any situation which arises."

Pride's easy calm was displayed in the face of a military situation that might become difficult. The Seventh Fleet, with its 100 ships, including four or five carriers, has unquestioned command of the sea's surface, but the Red Chinese air strength is formidable. The Communists (Chinese and Soviet) have 8,000 airplanes in the Far East area, about two-thirds of them jets. This is more than three times the combined number of planes based in the Far East by the U.S. and the Chinese Nationalists. But the Air Force's F-86 Sabrejet outkilled the Communist MIG 13-1 in one unit's Korea experience. With the Seventh Fleet the primary striking plane is the F9F6 Cougar, a swept-wing jet fighter that flies at more than 600 m.p.h.

Last week the U.S. beefed up its air strength in the area. The 45,000-ton aircraft carrier Midway canceled a visit to Singapore to speed on and join the Seventh Fleet. From Okinawa and the Philippines the Fifth Air Force flew its 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing (about 60 F-86s) onto Formosa. Within 20 minutes after the first contingent landed at Peach Garden Field amid flooded paddyfields south of Taipei, pilots were making themselves at home in a Nissen hut. On the wall of the hut was a pinup: a chart showing silhouettes of a MIG and a Russian light bomber. How long will the unit be there? Said a pilot: "God, my orders say we're going to be here indefinitely."

In the open waters off the China coast, the big aircraft carriers of Admiral Pride's Seventh Fleet were running around-the-clock launching and recovery practices for their airmen. All day long Skyraiders, Banshees, Panthers and Cougars moved constantly in training and practice-bombing flights. It was not just practice that Mel Pride had in mind. Throughout his fleet, the tacit assumption was that the Old Man wanted to keep Red China's radarscopes pipping to let them know that he had lots of air power.

Privately, some U.S. leaders in Washington insisted that there was no danger of the formal neutralization of Formosa because Red China could not agree to a ceasefire. Communist Premier Chou En-lai has repeatedly said that his government must have Formosa. He cannot, this theory runs, back down; the firming of the U.S. guarantee interposes a wall between Chou and his announced intention.

But Chou En-lai has also said that he intends to take Formosa from within. If Chiang is neutralized, if he ceases to be an instrument of pressure on Red China, if his government and troops lose the hope of exploiting rebellion or other future weaknesses in Red China, how long can Formosa last?

Mel Pride's Seventh Fleet can defend Formosa as real estate, but it cannot defend the morale and vitality of a government that may be deprived of a mission and a future.

Two Chinas? The prospective evacuation of the Tachens was not the only risk of a shooting war. Near to the mainland, opposite Formosa, lie the Nationalist-held Matsu Islands and Quemoy. The Reds, beaten off from Quemoy last September, might decide on another try after they have cleaned up the Tachens. President Eisenhower's message and the congressional resolution clearly imply that the Seventh Fleet will defend Quemoy and the Matsus.

These dangers spurred talk of a ceasefire, a subject that had received new impetus from the statements last fortnight of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles that they would welcome U.N. efforts to negotiate a cease-fire in the Formosa area.

The New Zealand delegation to the U.N. was preparing this week to ask the Security Council to begin arrangements for a ceasefire. In this move the New Zealanders were carrying the ball for Great Britain. In the House of Commons last week, Sir Anthony Eden answered Laborite complaints that the President's message to Congress was warlike; Eden assured the House that the President was really moving toward the British line. In the course of the debate the Foreign Secretary described the British line more candidly than ever before. A ceasefire, guaranteed by the U.N., might lead toward the two-China "wider settlement" for which Eden has been working. He wants two Chinas, both seated in the United Nations. Chiang would merely be head of a Republic of Formosa, with no claims to China.

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