Grim Deeds

While Chou En-lai spoke softly in Bandung his Communist followers were feverishly building a bigger and bigger force along China's east coast across from the Matsus, Quemoy and Formosa.

In the past fortnight Nationalist and U.S. intelligence sources have detected signs of two additional new airfields being started on the Fukien coast--near Amoy, the mainland port opposite Quemoy. They bring to five the total of Communist airfields recently built or abuilding on the mainland across from Formosa. Once completed and equipped, the new fields will give the Chinese Communists air striking power over the Nationalist-held offshore islands and Formosa. U.S. intelligence knows that the Chinese Communists have shifted their bomber forces southward into Fomrosa range; U.S. reconnaissance shows that the Communists have amassed heavy military equipment along the China coast.

A New Shape. In Washington the new intelligence was studied carefully by Secretary of State Dulles, Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson, Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Anderson, J.C.S. Chief Arthur W. Radford and Pacific Commander Felix Stump. They concluded that the Communists might soon be able to carry out their threat of an attack on Formosa. In the eyes of the U.S. strategists, this gave a new shape to the Formosa crisis: Quemoy and the Matsus became incidental; Formosa itself and the U.S. Seventh Fleet were in the eye of danger.

With this grim analysis John Foster Dulles flew to Augusta last week to brief President Eisenhower. When their conferences were over, the President personally approved sending Walter Robertson and Arthur Radford to Formosa with a specific, two-point mission: 1) to evaluate, in consultation with Chiang and Nationalist military leaders, the Communists' intentions; and 2) to consider whether it is necessary to reinforce the Formosa garrison with more U.S. strength, chiefly Air Force fighter and Army anti-aircraft units.

As Robertson and Radford flew toward the Orient, speculation about their mission ran off on a wrong trail. Press wires around the world clacked out the rumor that Radford and Robertson, two old friends of Chiang Kaishek, had been assigned to give him the bad news that the U.S. would not help him defend the Matsus and Quemoy, and to urge that he get his troops off those islands. They had no such orders and no such intentions. But since Formosa did not know why they were coming, or even how long they planned to stay, the worldwide speculation bred bafflement, anxiety and downright hostility in the Nationalist camp.

A Sudden Relaxation. Into that anxious atmosphere one day this week flew the silver, white and blue U.S. transport carrying Radford and Robertson. Their plane touched down at Taipei airport at precisely the scheduled hour of 11 a.m.. thereby satisfying Admiral Radford's passion for on-the-second arrivals. It was a sweet and winy morning, and Chinese and American greeters basked in the sunshine as the big plane landed. A Nationalist military band and a guard of honor stood by to salute the visitors. Heading the welcomers was Nationalist Foreign Minister Yeh, whose mood was not nearly as warm as his smile.

After pleasant greetings all around, Radford and Robertson went into conference with U.S. Ambassador Karl Rankin. The visitors lunched at the home of Major General William Chase, chief of the U.S. military assistance group on Formosa, then moved into their quarters in the luxurious guesthouse at Shihlin, only two minutes through the trees from the Chiang house. At Madame Chiang's invitation, they stayed there instead of at the usual lodgings for military and diplomatic visitors.

As the day wore on, the tense anxiety that had preceded the arrival of Radford and Robertson eased away. After several hours of conferences, which were expected to extend into several days, a Chinese Nationalist communique glowed that "the conversation was conducted in an atmosphere of great harmony." Taipei officialdom dropped the hostile mood induced by false interpretation of the Radford-Robertson mission. The Communists had shifted the Formosa crisis, but had not achieved any sharp break in relations between the U.S. and the Chinese Nationalists.

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