Monday, Oct. 17, 1955

The Existers

"The French will stay in North Africa as long as France exists. But does France exist?"

-- Abd el Krim, as quoted by Author John Gunther.

When ex-Premier Mendes-France offered the Assembly a bold program of action, the Deputies at first found it refreshing. But on further consideration, they decided that they did not like Mendes' brand of boldness. "Adventurism," they called it, and dismissed Mendes. Premier Edgar Faure offered them the opposite--a policy of the political carom shot, the showdown avoided, the adroit maneuver, the delicate adjustment. Last week the Deputies of France suddenly discovered that they were no longer amused by Edgar's "cleverness" either. Since in France the Assembly's whim is sovereign, this petulance brought France's government to its knees.

Some, the enemies of change in North Africa, were delighted. "The condition of the government is deteriorating satisfactorily," crowed one Deputy. All week long, owlish Edgar Faure maneuvered desperately to keep his government in power. He appealed to Frenchmen's patriotic pride, charging that the North African troubles were part of an "international offensive" against France, defending France's walkout from the U.N. Assembly rather than accept debate on Algeria. "Although France is weakened at present, she remains strong enough to abandon nothing of her national dignity." he cried.

But the crucial issue was Morocco, and there, Faure's carom shots had brought the crisis on himself. Three months ago he had sent Gilbert Grandval to Morocco to devise a plan. Grandval did. But when diehard colonists objected, Faure reacted characteristically. He adopted the plan and fired the man who devised it.

Who Obeys Whom? Like any attempt at appeasement, it encouraged his enemies, alienated his supporters. His own Defense Minister dared to oppose him; generals defied his wishes. His new Resident General, the colonists' candidate, General Boyer de Latour, carried out Faure's orders only as he saw fit. Rather than institute the three-man regency council that Faure had proposed, De Latour let Sultan Moulay Ben Arafa delegate his powers to a cousin. "Whom does General de Latour obey--your government or Marshal Juin or [Defense Minister] Koenig?" demanded the Socialists.

As the Assembly came back from its summer recess last week, Faure's government seemed to have only hours to live. Even the most dedicated advocates of Faure's planned reforms were disgusted at Faure's dithering. Returning from a quick meeting with West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Faure was greeted by aides bearing the bad news: Defense Minister Koenig and three other Gaullists had decided to withdraw from the Cabinet, and were demanding Faure's resignation in favor of a government of "national public salvation" to "reestablish French prestige throughout the world."

Faure was stung to sharp action. Calling a Cabinet meeting next morning, he sacked the ministers without waiting for their resignations; within hours he had installed as Defense Minister retired General Pierre Billotte, a member of the so-called "dissident Gaullists." Billotte's first order was a stern warning to defiant French generals henceforth, "every French soldier, regardless of rank, will do his duty." Then Billotte hastened to Morocco, with orders to hustle De Latour into doing what Faure had already told him to do-- form a regency council.

But the Gaullist defection started a political bank run. Backbench Deputies besieged their leaders, urging them to desert the government. They had differing reasons, but a single fear: if this government was blamed for "losing North Africa," they stood to lose their seats in next year's elections. The dissident Gaullists caucused and demanded that Minister of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs Pierre July resign. July refused. Then, the Independents voted for the withdrawal of Foreign Minister Pinay and the Independents' two other Cabinet members.

Too Far Too Fast. Little, deadpan Antoine Pinay, a Premier for ten months back in 1952, is not even the official leader of his own Independents. But he is uncontested No. 1 man of the right side of France's Assembly, accepted as boss by most of the 130 right-wing Deputies of four parties who call themselves "the moderates." Pinay was long known to be skeptical of "going too far too fast" in North Africa. If Pinay deserted, Faure was doomed. And if Faure fell, Pinay was the right-wingers' choice to succeed him.

Pinay did not desert. He summoned the moderates to a meeting, told them bluntly that he would not accept the premiership if Faure was brought down. To reporters he snapped: "I remain with Edgar. To hell with all the others."

Pinay had checked the run. Premier Faure strode into the Chamber and told the restless Deputies: "To criticize is not enough. Those who criticize must have another policy." To this challenge, the Deputies had no answer. Not even the Gaullists were recommending a return to all-out repression; not even the Socialists were objecting to the Faure program, only to the delays in carrying it out. With elections so near, nobody wanted either blame or credit for a different policy.

But delay had cost high in bitterness, frustration and inflamed passions.

P: Violence increased in both Algeria and Morocco. In Morocco, 700 Berber tribesmen burst out of the Atlas Mountains southeast of Fez and fell on the small French outpost of Imouzzer des Marmoucha. At exactly the same time, 90 miles to the north, other bands attacked the small town of Boured and two nearby outposts facing the border of Spanish Morocco. The besiegers cut roads, demolished bridges, held up French relief columns for six days before melting back into the hills. The attackers were highly organized, well armed, and skillfully directed by uniformed officers. The French bitterly charged that they were directed from Cairo (where Egypt gives sympathetic asylum to exiled Moroccan leaders), trained and harbored in Spanish Morocco.

P: In Morocco, 600 angry colons demonstrated against Deputy Resident General Franc,ois de Panafieu because he had pressed De Latour to implement Faure's program for a three-man regency council. To placate them, De Panafieu offered his resignation on the spot (later, Billotte refused to accept it).

P: In Rouen, 400 young reservists recalled to duty for service in North Africa mutinied as they were about to be loaded on trucks for shipment to Morocco. They locked their officers in the barracks kitchen, stood off police for 24 hours. Crowds of sympathetic workers, egged on by Communist leaders, hurled stones and even gasoline bombs at the police.

Mutiny is an ugly word, and in the Chamber, Deputies were sobered. Faure made a last, stern appeal: stop bickering, and make up your mind on what France should do in North Africa. Lest France be left alone and friendless in the world, he pleaded, "we must have a clear policy--not powerless sulking."

For the Sake of Reform. Slowly Faure picked up support. At week's end the Socialists reluctantly decided they would support him--for the sake of North African reform, which they approve, rather than Faure himself, whom they do not. With their 105 votes, they more than made up for the defecting Gaullists. Though Faure insisted he did not want or need them, the Communists (90 votes) also threw in with the Premier.

It was more than enough. After three days of bickering debate, the Deputies approved Faure's policy for Morocco by an emphatic 477 to 140. Significantly, it was not a vote of confidence in Faure himself, which he had not dared ask.

The Deputies had given their approval with ill grace, and for a reason they might better have recognized before they launched into the debate--no other course was possible. But the 7,500,000 natives of Morocco, for 43 years a French protectorate, had at last the National Assembly's promise of reforms leading to greater self-rule and, ultimately, to a transformation from colonial subservience to "independence within interdependence" with France.

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