Wasting War

The two trucks loaded with French recruits rumbled through a narrow pass in the Nemencha Mountains near the Tunisian border. In this ideal ambush terrain, a murderous hail of bullets burst from the cliffs above them. Two officers and 21 men were killed. The survivors jumped down, sought cover and fought back. Four hours later helicopters thrashed overhead. Each disgorged five men as reinforcements, picked up the wounded, flew off to return with a new load. For five days last week the battle raged as French troops and paratroopers tried to root the rebels out of caves in the cliffs. At battle's end more than 100 jellaghas were dead. So were some 40 Frenchmen.

The Nemencha battle was the longest battle of the Algerian war to date. From the rebellion's beginnings in the Constantine department 18 months ago, it has spread the length and width of Algeria. Last week French authorities announced the estimated casualties to date: 3,724 jellaghas killed, 2,000 captured. French losses: 672 soldiers and policemen killed, approximately the same number missing and presumed dead. Some 1,300 civilians have also died in terrorist attacks or reprisal killings. Reporters on the spot insist that there have been many more deaths than official sources chose to report--chiefly uncounted Moslems killed in reprisal for terrorist attacks.

Double Trouble. This wasting war costs France more than Indo-China ever did. With the U.S. paying 60%, the French share in Indo-China was $1,100,00 a day; in Algeria France has no outside help, and costs run close to $1,700,000 a day. In Indo-China France fought with a professional army (Africans. German Legionnaires), of which less than 100,000 were Frenchmen, against a Viet Minh army operating, for the most part, out of clearly defined zones that could be attacked by tanks, artillery, and bombers. In Algeria twice as many French soldiers are engaged against rebels who fight in small bands of 50 or 100 that vanish under strong attack to fight again somewhere else. The French have the lives of 1,000,000 Frenchmen (v. 140,000 in Indo-China) and thousands of farms to protect. The colons demand protection for their property, would like a guard for every farm. The army demands concentrated forces to attack and root out cen ters of rebel infection. The government has compromised by doing both.

The double program:

P: Quadrillage (cross-ruling), to carry out what Premier Guy Mollet calls "a policy of presence." Small garrisons of ten or more men will be set up at some 20,000 sensitive spots throughout the country--at bridges, crossroads, in villages. Quadrillage ties up enormous numbers of troops, but is intended to reassure the Europeans that they and their property will be protected, and to provide Moslems with a visible reminder that the French are in Algeria to stay. As soon as an area is pacified by quadrillage, the French hope to organize pilot, mixed elections as evidence of their good intentions.

P: Grenonillage (roughly, leapfrogging), to kill off the rebel bands. Decoy patrols are sent out into the hills to act as moving targets, inviting attack. Supporting them are teams of helicopters scattered in impromptu bases. When an attack comes, the patrol radios to the base. In a typical grenouillage operation last week, a call came in to Lieut. Colonel Marcel Bigeard, established in a burned-out farmhouse south of Bone. Within minutes, Bigeard had seven helicopters loaded up; he took off, returned with 15 captured rebels, three mortars and 60 rifles.

Show of Force. The double policy is enormously demanding on French manpower. Quadrillage will require 200,000 men. Grenouillage requires another 150,000. By mid-May, the Mollet government has promised 75,000 men drawn from reserves to add to the 210,000 France already has in Algeria, another 100,000 more by fall, if needed. Says Mollet hopefully: "We want to show force so we don't have to use it--or use it as little as possible."

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