Monday, Jun. 11, 1956

"As Simple as That"

In strong and unyielding words, Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden last week made the British government's position in Cyprus clear and flat. Without bothering to clothe it in the familiar language of imperialistic idealism, Sir Anthony defined Britain's stake in one word: oil. "Our country's industrial life and that of Western Europe," he told a Tory Party audience in Norwich, "depend today, and must depend for many years, on oil supplies from the Middle East. If ever our oil resources were imperiled, we should be compelled to defend them. The facilities we need in Cyprus are part of that defense. "No Cyprus--no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil--hunger and unemployment in Britain. It's as simple as that." This was certainly plain speaking. Eden went farther, accused Britain's ally, Greece, of fomenting much of the trouble. "It is certainly contrary to the whole spirit of NATO," he said, "that one of its members should seek by radio propaganda of the foulest character, directed from its capital month after month, to stir up terrorist activity in the territory of another. There can be no confidence, still less friendship, while this continues. "It is sometimes suggested that a NATO base on Greek soil should suffice for our needs. This is not so." There might be occasions when Britain alone or Britain and its Baghdad Pact partners, might have to act in the Middle East in situations which do not involve NATO. Eden, in the face of criticism abroad and at home, was arguing that if Cyprus itself is not to be a British base, there must at least be a British base in Cyprus. Thus he has laid down one clear requisite of any solution.

Another requisite--self-determination for the Cypriots--has already been laid down by Greece. The big question is whether these demands are reconcilable, or whether events have gone past the point of no return. Britain's attempt to hold its Cyprus base by repression is fast destroying the good will of the population, which is necessary to any solution. But if Britain has to back down, it is entitled to know that any settlement it makes is not undone by some future wave of passion, such as eventually drove its troops first from Egypt itself and then from the Suez Canal. This is where NATO (which is seeking new tasks for itself) might usefully step in. If Greece can be satisfied by the pace and genuineness of self-determination, if Britain can in return secure its Cyprus base, then their agreement might well be guaranteed by NATO, thereby being underwritten not only by the interested parties (Britain, Greece and Turkey), but by the U.S. and the eleven other NATO powers.

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