The Morality of Give & Take

In the old days of ruffled-shirt diplomacy, when Talleyrand and Prince Metternich were in 19th century flower, a diplomat needed a backstairs source in the palace, a talent for intrigue and a good cook. Big powers acted in concert, and the small powers were expected to know their place. The financial side of diplomacy was a relatively simple matter of buying allies or buying off potential enemies. In mid-20th century diplomacy, financial dealings must be disguised under such inoffensive names as mutual assistance, economic cooperation or foreign aid, and economic aid has increasingly become regarded as a debt that rich nations owe poor ones. Prince Metternich never had to wrestle with some of the difficulties that preoccupied diplomats and governments all over the world last week. Items:

In giving aid to a new nation, one must not offend its old master.

In a threadbare, third-floor suite of rooms on a Paris back street, Tunisian Premier Habib Bourguiba told U.S. Ambassador to France C. Douglas Dillon that 400,000 unemployed Tunisians face starvation after two years of poor harvest. Tunisia, said Bourguiba, needs wheat fast. Dillon is keenly aware that France often resents U.S. aid and similar "interference" in North Africa. Had Bourguiba discussed his problem with the French government? Oh yes, said Bourguiba, it was the French Finance Minister, Paul Ramadier, who suggested that Tunisia should put the bite on the U.S.

A change of tune can change a deal.

Last March West Germany agreed to give Yugoslavia $74 million in World War II reparations and long-term loans. But now that Tito had gone to Moscow and talked about Germany's "two sovereign states," Bonn feared he was about to recognize the puppet East German regime. Despite private assurances that Tito would not do so, the Adenauer government last week pointedly allowed West Germany's Bundestag to adjourn for the summer without ratifying the Yugoslav treaty. "Blackmail," cried Yugoslavia's Politika, but West Germany is prepared to wait until Tito's assurances sound as loud and clear as his original remarks in Moscow's Dynamo Stadium.

Sometimes a nation will say "thank you" if it does not have to add "much obliged."

For three years the Socialist government of neutral Burma has refused to take U.S. aid. It was willing to try barter deals with Iron Curtain nations, only to find that Burma invariably wound up on the losing end. Last week, disillusioned with barters and angered by Russian and Chinese support of Burmese Communists, Burma's new Premier U Ba Swe announced that he hoped to get a long-term low-interest loan of $20 million to $30 million from the U.S. as a business deal "without strings," thus compromising neither Burma's neutrality nor her self-respect as a sovereign nation. The U.S. will supply technicians in exchange for Burma's rice.

Sometimes a nation is willing to be saved if the price is right.

In Karachi last week U.S. Vice President Nixon bluntly warned that any country that takes Soviet economic aid on the supposition that it is without strings is likely to wind up with "a rope tied around its neck." But he went on to declare that U.S. aid to such countries might help them maintain their independence of Russia. A Pakistani official translated it this way to New York Times Correspondent Abe Rosenthal: "Mr. Nixon says Soviet aid will make you a satellite. Then he says we will keep on giving you money if you take aid from the Russians so as to help you avoid becoming a satellite. What would any sensible man answer? He would say to the Russians, 'Please give me $100 million.' Then he would say to you. Americans, 'Yes, I will gladly accept another $100 million from you to help me guard against the dangers of the Russians' $100 million.' "

In accepting Russian hospitality, it is wise to know when to quit.

Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitry Shepilov reportedly has offered an easy-credit loan to help Egypt build its High Dam on the Nile at Aswan. Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser is happy to have a counteroffer to set against the $270 million primary financing proposed by the U.S., Britain and the World Bank. (The Western offer awaits some ironing out of details, and is also stalled by U.S. reconsideration of where Nasser stands since his arms deal with Communist Czechoslovakia.) To get the Russian loan, Nasser would have to mortgage Egypt's all-important cotton crops for 20 years. Nasser asked advice of his friend, Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito, an old hand at playing roulette with Russia. Tito warned him to beware of the Russian habit of turning trade on and off for political purposes. The Yugoslavs, said Expert Tito, have developed a rule of thumb: not more than 25% of a nation's foreign trade can safely be given to Russia.

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