The Long Way Around

In the grey German summer of 1948 Joseph Stalin reached out to strangle helpless Berlin, and U.S. planners, although caught unawares, responded with a monument to man's ingenuity: the Berlin Air Lift. In late summer 1956 Western Europe faces a challenge that dwarfs Stalin's Berlin blockade. The great question: How, if Egypt's President Nasser closes down the Suez Canal--either by force or bungling--will Western Europe get the oil that is blood to its industry and life to its economy? The answer: a Suez Sea Lift.

As in 1948 the burden of action falls on the U.S.--a fact that both Britain's Prime Minister Eden and Secretary of State Dulles clearly recognized in their public statements last week. But this time U.S. planners will not be caught napping. Since last May experts of the State, Commerce, Interior and Defense Departments and the Office of Defense Mobilization have been charting their course. In August, within a fortnight after Colonel Nasser's Suez seizure, the ODM had in hand a general "Plan of Action," now being worked out in detail by a crack Middle East Emergency Committee (made up of representatives from 14 top U.S. oil companies).

Vital Statistics. The plan envisions the most immense operation in oil logistics in human history. The Suez Sea Lift calculates that Western Europe's oil deficit would be made up in two major ways:

1) By routing tankers 11,254 nautical miles around the Cape of Good Hope from Persian Gulf ports to Western Europe. The trip would require more than 30 days, as against the 12-or 13-day journey through the Suez and Mediterranean (see map).

2) By vastly increasing the exports to Western Europe of U.S., Caribbean and Canadian oil.

Western Europe's present daily oil imports total about 2,500,000 bbls. Of that, about 2,000,000 bbls., or 80%, come from the Middle East. Tankers carry about 1,200,000 bbls. a day through the Suez; the other 800,000 bbls. are sluiced through pipelines to Mediterranean ports and pumped aboard tankers there. Assuming that Nasser does not succeed in getting his Arab neighbors to cut off the pipelines (which would virtually amount to an act of war), Western Europe can concentrate its worries on finding a way to make up for the loss of the 1,200,000 bbls. now shipped through the Suez.

The Suez Sea Lift calls for moving some 800,000 bbls. of Middle East oil daily around the Cape of Good Hope--a schedule that U.S. planners consider well within reason. The other 400,000 bbls. would come from increased Western Hemisphere production, most of it from the U.S. Current U.S. production stands at about 7,000,000 bbls. a day--with an available productive capacity of 2,000,000 more. The Venezuelan government last week announced that it stands ready to shove up its oil production by 500,000 bbls. daily (U.S. experts believe, however, that 200,000 would be closer to the feasible mark).

Where the paper work leaves off the grave problems begin. The two greatest: tanker transport and dollars.

Tanker Troubles. There are roughly 2,800 tankers in the world--with about 2,300 of them belonging to the West. The U.S. has about 645 tankers, of which 26 are in mothballs. Twelve more are scheduled for delivery in the near future. Present U.S. pipeline facilities could not handle the additional domestic oil production contemplated by the Suez Sea Lift planners, so barges and railroad tank cars would be pressed into heavy use to move oil from the fields to the ports. Nor are there enough U.S. coastwise tankers to transport more oil from the Gulf Coast to the East Coast, so by Executive Order the U.S. would have to loosen its restriction against the use of foreign-flag tankers in the U.S. coastal service.

Within 20 minutes after the closing of the Suez Canal, work can start on demothballizing the U.S. reserve tanker fleet (estimated time and cost per ship: two weeks and $350,000). Within hours, the basic plan for U.S. domestic transport can go into effect. On the high seas all loaded tankers will immediately turn their bows toward the United Kingdom and Western Europe, to help take up the slack while the cape shuttle is getting started. With such measures U.S. planners figure that present tanker capacity would supply the West until a crash tanker-construction program could take effect.

Dollar Difficulties. To pay for the added supplies of Western Hemisphere oil, Western Europe would have to spend dollars instead of the sterling that now buys midEastern oil. This would deplete Western Europe's already short dollar reserves by some $500 million a year. The dollar-short United Kingdom will be hardest hit, faced with some $400 million of the added costs. Neither the United Kingdom nor the other Western European nations can make the grade without help. The U.S. stands ready to extend the necessary $500 million to Western Europe in the form of long-term credit from the Export-Import Bank (an offer that Secretary Dulles plans to make in London this week during conferences on the Suez users plan-- see FOREIGN NEWS). A small but perhaps significant contribution could be made by diverting the $2,716,000 now extended to Egypt by the International Cooperation Administration.

The Suez Sea Lift, when and if it becomes necessary, will be an expensive, difficult operation that will mean sacrifice by the Western governments and their citizens. But to an even greater extent it will hurt Egypt and its dictator. Most of Egypt's Suez revenues (Nasser said his Suez nationalization would get Egypt $100 million a year) will be cut off. Other economic sanctions can be utilized. The reduced oil purchases from the Middle East might force some of the petroleum-rich sultans and sheiks to switch from Cadillacs to camels--a turn of events that should cause them to reconsider their support of Nasser. Top U.S. officials are therefore by no means whistling in the dark when they predict that the Suez Sea Lift is the weapon to defeat Nasser without a gun being fired.

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