Monday, Feb. 04, 1957
A-Bombs for Small Wars
That the U.S. has every intention of using tactical atomic weapons in "local" wars, e.g., the Middle East, has long been obvious from budget figures, production schedules and strong official hints. But it remained for President Eisenhower, speaking calmly and even casually at his news conference last week, to put the policy on the record. Said Ike: "We do regard these smaller [atomic] weapons as an almost routine part of our equipment nowadays, and you would almost have to use them ..."
For all its offhandedness, the President's remark touched on the raw nerve ends of those who fear--and have volubly argued --that the little atom in little wars will trigger a Big-Atom World War III. Not so, says Air Force Secretary Donald A. Quarles in a carefully reasoned article in the February issue of Flying:
"Certainly we did not employ our most modern weapons in the Korean conflict, yet five months after it began, that conflict was expanded into a larger clash between Red Chinese forces and the United Nations Command. Clearly, not using our most modern weapons did not prevent the expansion of the Korean conflict. The best way to prevent a local war from expanding into a total war is to end the local war quickly and decisively . . .
"Most hopefully, there are very good reasons to believe that the intent to use our best weapons at once in meeting local Communist aggression--an intent made clear and plain to the Communists-- would prevent such aggressions. If we foolishly allowed the Communists to be lieve that they could engage in aggression on their own timetable, in the place they choose, and with assurance they would meet only the type weapons they elect to employ, we would encourage local aggression everywhere."
Quarles's firm conclusion: Though much is spoken "of the uses of modern weapons in the prosecution of war . . . the most profitable use of modern arms is in making their readiness for employment and the intent to employ them so plain that no war occurs. To deter not only total war, but limited war as well, I believe we must make clear to all potential aggressors that we will resist aggression with our quality weapons from the outset. Any lesser posture of deterrence is an open invitation to aggression, and is less than our best effort to avert war."
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