What If . . .?

That last spasm of European gunboat diplomacy, the British-French invasion of Egypt, shattered the already fractured historical pattern in which Britain and France acted as order-keepers in the Middle East. Thrust upon the U.S. was the task of trying to restore law and order, a task vastly complicated by the Middle East's blindered hatreds and prides, and by the 20th century necessity of conducting foreign affairs in a goldfish bowl. In edging toward the goal of order, U.S. diplomacy has met a remarkable series of tricky "What Ifs?" In each case the U.S. and the U.N. between them kept the "If" from happening. Items:

P: What if Britain, France and Israel refuse to give in to the U.N.'s demand for a ceasefire? They gave in.

P: What if they refuse to withdraw from Egypt? Britain and France withdrew completely; Israel withdrew from all but the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba's western shore.

P: What if Egypt's touchy Gamal Abdel Nasser refuses to admit the U.N. emergency force? Or refuses to let the West start clearing the Suez Canal? Nasser yielded on both points.

P: What if Nasser goes on buddying with Russia and stirring up trouble in the Middle East? By such roundabout but effective means as inviting Arabia's King Saud to the U.S., Eisenhower, Dulles & Co. have already managed to speed the shrinkage of Nasser's prestige among his Middle East neighbors (see FOREIGN NEWS).

Israelis, Go Home. Last week's question was What If the Israelis refuse to get out of Gaza and the Aqaba shore? Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tried two mutually reinforcing approaches in an attempt to persuade the Israelis to go home: a threat of punishment if they did not, a promise of reward if they did. A fortnight ago he reminded Israel that if the U.N. voted sanctions, the U.S. might have to join in. Last week he followed up with the promise. If Israel would get out of Egypt, said Dulles to Israel's Ambassador Abba Eban, the U.S. would:

P: Declare that it considered the Gulf of Aqaba an international waterway. If that move worked, Israel would get the prize she has been demanding: access to the sea.

P: Try to persuade the U.N. to station troops in Gaza to guard against Egyptian raids into Israeli territory.

Mistaking Dulles' offer for an invitation to bargain, Eban & Co. countered by asking for a lot more: "steps to guarantee" freedom of navigation in the Gulf, assurances that Egypt would not be permitted to take over the Gaza Strip again. Dulles tried to make it clear to Eban that the offer was not expandable.

Russians, Stay Home. While Eban, after delivering Israel's answer to Secretary Dulles, was still telling newsmen about it in the State Department reception room, Dulles took a private elevator to the basement garage, rode to the Washington airport. At 10:30 p.m. he was discussing the latest Middle East twists with President Eisenhower, and U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge at Thomasville, Ga. Next morning, after a post-breakfast huddle with Ike before a cheery log fire, Dulles flew back to Washington for more talks with Eban.

At week's end Israel's latest answer was an almost final no, and the latest What If still loomed. In a remarkably strong statement issued at Thomasville, President Eisenhower once again urged Israel to withdraw, noted that Israel had received "the maximum assurance that it can reasonably expect at this juncture, or that can be reconciled with fairness to others." Meanwhile, the U.S. had answered a bigger question: What if armed Communism tries an overt gunpoint grab in the Middle

East? In voting out the President's Middle East resolution (see below), a Senate committee, echoing the President and the House of Representatives, replied: If the victim calls for help, the U.S. will fight. With that aggression-deterring answer shielding the Middle East, Dulles & Co. can go on dealing with lesser What Ifs--and inching toward the goal of order.

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