Dueling Code

When the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee doggedly assembled in London last March, most observers conceded it no more chance than any other of the innumerable futile sessions the West had held with the Russians over the past eleven years. Europeans remarked sagely that the Eisenhower Administration had found an ideal job for Harold Stassen--all talk and no action. But the slow recognition that this time the Russians might be serious* has made everyone suddenly cautious. The Russians had accepted, at least in broadest principle, Eisenhower's "open skies" inspection and offered for the first time to admit international observers to Russian territory to check on bomb testing. Last week Western governments found themselves re-examining a question they had not seriously considered for years: Does the West really want disarmament?

In the classic sense of destruction of tanks, warships, guns, most Western capitals found that their answer was no: as Macmillan recently told Bulganin, the arms buildup could hardly stop until the legitimate political fears that produced it had been overcome. But the subject of the London talks was not, strictly speaking, disarmament, but the development of a dueling code. Having discovered that neither side could attack the other (or even defend itself) without incurring self-destruction, both were concerned that no sudden moves or impulsive gestures, misunderstood by nervous opponents, should plunge them together into nuclear oblivion. The proposals were not to lay down weapons but rather to sheathe them.

Thus the U.S. object is to devise ways of preventing a big nuclear war or of containing lesser ones. Its proposals, in broad outline:

P: To forestall surprise attack, inspection of border areas from the air, of airports and missile bases by ground teams. P:To reduce the likelihood of brush-fire wars spreading into world conflagrations, some reductions in total manpower and armaments by the major powers (e.g., U.S. and Russia to 1,700,000 men apiece), plus inspections and bans on the import and export of arms, and checks on troop movements. European nations have worried lest the U.S., by nuclear disarmament alone, might leave them defenseless against Russian superiority in "classical" arms.

P:To discourage other powers from developing atomic bombs (experts estimate that no less than 20 nations could develop their own bombs in the next ten years), the U.S. was urging that the three present nuclear powers accept a cutoff date when production of nuclear weapons will cease everywhere, and all nuclear materials will thereafter be diverted to peaceful purposes.

Last week Stassen methodically filled in the details of the U.S. plan in London, day by day. He proposed an immediate cut of U.S. and Russian forces to 2,500,-ooo each (an old figure that both sides have used at one time or another). A second-and third-stage cut bringing troop strength down to 1,700,000 could be left to the future and would depend on "political conditions."

What conditions? Russia's Valerian Zorin wanted to know. The unification of Germany, for example, said Stassen. Next Stassen suggested that each state make up a list of arms that it would be willing to set aside. The lists should be negotiated until each side felt the trade was even, then the arms sequestered under the eyes of international inspectors in special depots in each nation's home territory (thus if one side broke its word, the other would have quick access to its own arms). A year after sequestration, the arms would be disposed of or converted to peaceful uses. "We can agree to it," nodded Zorin. He hoped that the U.S. would submit its list first. "A milestone," cried one U.S. observer.

But Stassen still had a way to go. In Washington, Secretary of State Dulles made clear that the U.S. would not (as Ike had suggested) accept a simple suspension of nuclear tests unless accompanied by general agreement for a cutoff of nuclear-weapon production (see NATIONAL AFFAIRS). There were still disagreements among the allies about some other aspects of the U.S. plan. The British would like to see the cutoff date put off until they can build up their stockpile of bombs. Some NATO countries--France, Belgium, The Netherlands and West Germany--are none too happy over being included in the trial aerial-inspection zone. At week's end Stassen flew over to Paris to confer with NATO's council.

Fingers were still crossed. The proposition was not that the U.S. should scrap any of its military potential in exchange for a Russian promise to do the same, but to find out whether reciprocal, safeguarded moves are 1) feasible, 2) possible.

*One veteran U.S. diplomat says that he never asks himself "Are the Russians sincere?" but merely "Are they serious?"

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.