Monday, Dec. 23, 1957

On the Spot

"You," said Texas Democrat Lyndon Johnson, "are the man on the spot--the man to whom the American people look for missiles." The man on the spot was Pentagon's Guided Missiles Director William M. Holaday--and after his bumbling and uninformed testimony before Johnson's Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee last week, both Holaday and the Defense Department's direction of the missile program were on the hottest spot ever.

First of all, Lyndon Johnson was concerned whether Holaday had "the facilities that truly make you a director in charge of missiles or whether you just have the title." Asked to define his duties, Holaday said: "I would act more like a vice president of a corporation." Then, after a vague explanation of what a corporation vice president might do, Holaday asked hopefully: "Does that help?" Replied Subcommittee Counsel Edwin Weisl bleakly: "No, sir."

When Is Any Time? On the basis of his testimony, Holaday's knowledge of the Defense Department's missile operations was a cut above the office-boy level, far short of what an alert vice president should know. Holaday, 56, was brought to the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development in February 1956, under Defense Secretary Charles Wilson. His credentials: he had worked first as assistant laboratory .manager, later as director of research for the Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., served as a Pentagon petroleum expert during and since World War II. Last May he was upgraded from R & D to become the Pentagon straw boss for missiles. But last week, after seven months, he seemed to know little about the various Defense Department advisory committees with which he is supposed to work closely; he admitted ignorance about how long the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile program had been in the works, when Consolidated Vultee Aircraft got the Atlas contract, whether there had been an original target date for the Atlas program. Holaday testified that he had authority to grant priorities on missile programs, but when questioned about priority classification he hemmed, hawed, consulted with advisers and finally backed off, saying: "I am not an expert." He told how he had recommended the production of both the Army's Jupiter and Air Force's Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles, rather than trying to concentrate on one or the other. Asked Counsel Weisl: "Have either of these systems been fully tested as to guidance, propulsion, engine performance and so forth?" Said Holaday, after a long, glum pause: "No, they have not. They have completed only about 10% of their research and development program." The subcommittee stung William Holaday with questions about a speech he had made the previous week to the American Rocket Society in New York. In that speech Holaday had said: "We will be able to have large satellites whenever we want them." Well, asked Investigator Weisl, what about it? Holaday protested that he could reply only in closed session. Lyndon Johnson pulled off his dark glasses (worn to shield his eyes from the glaring lights in the hearing room), demanded to know why Holaday had to go into private to discuss a statement made in a public speech, kept pressing him for an explanation of his New York statement. Said Holaday: "Well, sir, what I stated there was the ability we have. When I say 'any time,' this does not mean tomorrow."

How Much Is Enough? Questioned about the Pentagon's longstanding claim that the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile has been getting top priority, Holaday admitted that the Defense Department had just ordered a step-up in the Atlas program that would increase the money outlay by 33%. A decision to that effect, he said, had been made "verbally" on Dec. 2--but he admitted that it was at least ten days before anyone got around to putting it in writing and got it started through channels.

Despite Holaday's belief that the Atlas program is in pretty good shape, a more realistic estimate came in a letter to the subcommittee from a man with more knowledge of Atlas than any that William Holaday had displayed. Wrote James R. Dempsey, manager of the Atlas program for Convair: "The present planning of the Government for ... the Atlas as currently known to us is less than it could be, and if we correctly understand the Soviet accomplishments in the ballistic missile field, the present Atlas program will tend to widen rather than close the gap between the U.S. and Soviet ICBM capability"

All in all, if Missile Director Holaday's testimony accurately reflects the kind of top management the U.S. missile program has been getting, the Senate Subcommittee clearly has its work cut out for it. And the high civilian command in the Pentagon is likely to be hopping busily from spot to hot spot.

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