Muddled Direction

To the sad chronicle of muddled administration in the Pentagon were added some shocking new paragraphs last week as the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee went into its third week of hearings. Items:

P: Heavy-jawed General Curtis E. LeMay, longtime SAC commander and now Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, disclosed that a "majority" of the Strategic Air Command's aircraft were grounded for lack of fuel during the last several weeks of fiscal 1957 (ending June 30). Jolting as it was, LeMay's statement checked out. For five weeks SAC had just enough gas to get off the ground in case of actual attack, almost none to spare for training or readiness flights, although it is basic SAC policy to keep part of its bombers in the air at all times in order to 1) reduce vulnerability to surprise attack, and 2) speed retaliation. Defense Department Comptroller Wilfred J. McNeil, sometime rear admiral, U.S.N.R., refused to release extra funds for gasoline, insisted that SAC must have wasted M. & O. (maintenance and operations) money for golf courses and other frivolities. Whether or not he was right about that--SAC, of course, denied the charge--the hard fact was that for five weeks the U.S.'s No. 1 deterrent force was lamed by the decision of the custodian of the Defense Department books.

P: LeMay and Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas D. White testified that lack of funds has stalled SAC's "minimum" program for dispersing its bases and improving its capacity for getting into the air fast in an alert. The Administration, said LeMay, has done nothing since Sputnik I to speed up the minimum program, or even to restore the cuts that SAC took during the Pentagon's frantic dollar pinch in the last months of fiscal 1957.

P: Assistant Navy Secretary Garrison Norton charged that a "dollar straitjacket" had "seriously hampered" missile research and development. As Norton told it, the Navy continually had to get approval from Comptroller McNeil to spend the skimpy R. & D. (research and development) funds voted by Congress. Asked the subcommittee's Counsel Edwin L. Weisl: What experts does McNeil have on his staff to advise him on R. & D. projects? Replied Norton: "None."

P: Rear Admiral Charles E. Weakley, Navy submarine chief, told the committee that the menace of Russia's huge submarine fleet is "without parallel."* The Navy has the "techniques" to cope with the menace, said Weakley, but needs more men, more money.

P: Air Force Secretary James H. Douglas ventured that the Air Force's Atlas ICBM would be operational in two years, but he cast doubt on the value of his prediction by showing painful gaps in his information. Pointing to Defense Department claims that the Atlas program has been stepped up, Counsel Weisl asked Douglas whether the manufacturer, Convair, had been told to push ahead faster. Replied Douglas: "I believe so ... I cannot answer personally--of my own knowledge." (Afterwards Weisl disclosed that he had been in touch with Convair that morning and been told that the Pentagon had not yet directed the firm to speed up the Atlas program.) Later on in his testimony Douglas proved to be unaware that the Air Force recently ordered a 50% cutback in production of its 5.000-mile subsonic Snark guided missile.

At midweek the preparedness subcommittee recessed. Thus far in its study of the state of U.S. defenses, it had learned that far too much of the Pentagon is wreathed in fog and confusion.

* Russia has some 500 subs to the U.S.'s 200, is building more than 50 a year to the U.S.'s half a dozen or so. The U.S. has three nuclear subs: Nautilus, Seawolf and the brand-new killer sub Skate. The Russian navy may have no atomic subs so far, but the new edition of Jane's Fighting Ships published last week reported that the Russians are designing what they call "under water satellites": nuclear-powered subs capable of launching IRBMs.

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