THE U.S. MISSILE PROGRAM

A Sturdy Base for a New Drive into Space

The fact that the U.S. is behind the Soviets in the production of long-range missiles has been heralded in headline and oratory. Frequently ignored is another fact: the Russians began an all-out missile program after World War II; the U.S. not until 1953-54. Considering its late start--a lapse in both Truman and Eisenhower administrations--the U.S., with 38 missile programs under way, has made progress at a remarkable rate, has the capacity to go much faster once the Pentagon gives real direction. How the program stands:

Intercontinental Missiles

Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. has an operational intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), nor will either have one for two to three years. To date, the Russians are known to have test-fired as many as five ICBMs, have scored at least one hit on a target at a 3,400-mile range; the U.S. has test-fired four models of the Air Force's Convair ICBM Atlas, has scored two hits at a programed initial 500-to 600-mile range. Atlas, U.S. missilery's prime weapon (cost: about $4,000,000 apiece) is fueled with a mixture of liquid oxygen and kerosene, is designed to deliver a hydrogen warhead of megaton dimensions at a speed of about 14,000 m.p.h. to a target five miles in diameter at a 5,500-mile range. Atlas has 300,000 parts, is so thin-skinned that it must be pressurized to stand upright; its three engines, simultaneously ignited on the ground, can generate a total thrust of between 300,000 and 400,000 lbs., or roughly what it took the Soviets to put up Sputnik II; its snub nose cone is designed to withstand the intense heat of reentry into the earth's atmosphere. Because Atlas got a later start than its Russian opposite number, its single-stage design is more modern, more foolproof than the ponderous three-stage Russian ICBM.

The Air Force hopes Atlas will be test-fired to its full 5,500-mile range this year. Even though testing will not be completed until 1960-61, an Atlas pilot production line is already running at Convair, can be turned on to full quantity when called for.

The Air Force has a "backup," or reserve ICBM, the Martin Titan, currently running twelve to 14 months behind Atlas. Titan is a two-stage, liquid-fuel missile with an Atlas-type nose cone and an Atlas-sized engine thrust that can power a hydrogen warhead more than 5,500 miles. Another advantage: Titan can be broken down into two parts for easier ground or air-cargo transportation. Titan has undergone static tests of its component parts, has not yet been tested as a complete weapons system, is not expected to reach test-flight status until fall.

Until the ICBMs are ready, the Air Force must depend upon its manned thermonuclear bombers reinforced by its only near-operational intercontinental guided missile, the Northrop Snark, an air-breathing, star-guided, 600-m.p.h. missile that can take a hydrogen warhead 5,000 miles to target or deploy electronic countermeasures over an enemy heartland to lure defenders away from main bomber strikes elsewhere.

Intermediate Missiles

Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. has an operational 1,500-mile ballistic missile, but the Russians have an operational stockpile of several hundred shorter-range (800 to 1,200 miles) ballistic missiles deployed in more than 50 bases, with a range into Europe and the Far East. The U.S. Air Force is ahead of its schedule on developing its first IRBM, Douglas' liquid-fuel, 1,500-mile Thor. It has test-fired ten Thors, five successfully, two part-successfully, has a production line going, expects to deploy well upward of 20 Thors into Europe with "initial operational capability" this year. Thor is guided by an inertial direction system backed up by an alternate method, is powered by a single rocket engine that generates a big kick of 135,000 lbs. Recently Defense Secretary Neil McElroy ordered Chrysler to get a production line set up for the Army's liquid-fuel 1,500-mile Jupiter, and hopes to deliver a dozen or so Jupiters to NATO late this year. One of Jupiter's several major weaknesses is that fueling and other primping take so long that Jupiter would be of little use as a threat of instant retaliation.

Looking ahead, the U.S.'s best intermediate-range prospect is the Navy's experimental solid-charge, 1,500-mile Lockheed Polaris, designed to be fired from surface vessels or nuclear submarines. Polaris' solid charge, a slow-burning chemical compound, makes Polaris the U.S.'s first "second-generation" long-range ballistic missile; the solid charge will be easier, simpler, faster to handle than present types of liquid fuel. Polaris, the first true pushbutton IRBM in sight, is lighter and smaller, so cannot pack as heavy a warhead as Jupiter and Thor. Its ultimate success will depend for several years upon 1) development of hydrogen warheads lighter than present models; 2) improvement of solid fuels to get more reliability and longer range; 3) production of a fleet of new-design nuclear submarines, each equipped to store, transport and fire a big salvo. Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke looks to test-fire the first Polaris this summer, to get Polaris operational before 1960. The Air Force also is interested in a solid-fuel, Polaris-type missile for its own land-based "second generation."

Penetration Missiles

Much closer to operational status are the U.S.'s "strategic penetration aids," i.e., air-to-ground missiles designed to be lifted almost all the way to target by subsonic 6-47 and 6-52 intercontinental jet bombers, then let fly at supersonic speed at ranges of 100 miles or more to dump hydrogen warheads onto targets. Just about operational is the Air Force's 100-mile, 1,000-m.p.h. Bell Rascal, already in pilot production. North American's Project WS-131B is an experimental supersonic hydrogen-warhead item with a 350-mile range. And Convair's new supersonic 6-58 jet bomber carries a B58 Pod that can be used, among other things, as a powered air-to-ground missile or a free-fall hydrogen bomb.

A key purpose of strategic penetration aids is deception. Fairchild is therefore developing the all-Fiberglas Goose and McDonnell the Green Quail, both very small, very promising missiles intended to take electronic countermeasures over enemy territory to mix up enemy radar. Advantage of Fiberglas: it is invisible to radar and infra-red detection. Northrop is also developing Crossbow, a vicious air-to-ground missile designed to home in on enemy radar stations and kill them. Another probable radar-killer: Navy's experimental Martin Bullpup.

Defense Missiles

In the air-missile power equation, the offensive is so far ahead of the defensive that antiaircraft and anti-missile systems can hardly expect to achieve more than 25% effectiveness. The U.S. is nonetheless now developing 25 defensive missiles, with prime attention to the Air Force's area-defense Bomarc, a ramjet-powered interceptor that is designed to kill enemy aircraft 350 miles away and 60,000 ft. up. Boeing's Bomarc is just moving into full production. This week the Air Force will give Boeing a production-letter contract for about 100 Bomarcs and ground-support equipment. The Army has long deployed around U.S. big cities its operational point-defense missile Nike Ajax, a beam rider with a range of about 25 miles, but Nike Ajax can easily be deflected by enemy countermeasures. The Army is meanwhile well along on the experimental Nike Hercules, a more sophisticated, solid-fuel missile with an atomic warhead. And the Army is also developing a specialty item, Raytheon's solid-fuel Hawk, designed to meet attack by enemy bombers scooping in at low level beneath U.S. radar.

Some Air Force and Navy interceptor planes are already using air-to-air guided missiles (with electronic or infra-red detection) to boost their chances of a hit, e.g., the Air Force's three types of the Hughes Falcon and the Navy's Sidewinder, but such missiles must make a direct hit to kill, can be deflected by enemy countermeasures. Most promising experimental Air Force air-to-air missile: the Douglas Genie, a non-guided atomic missile that can kill at near-miss range of half a mile or more by the brute force of its explosion. Genie has been test-fired successfully in Nevada.

Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. has defensive missiles effective against ballistic-missile attack from land or from surface vessels or submarines. President Eisenhower wants the anti-missile missile program put on a crash basis, has asked for some results by next year. The Air Force is considering development of Con-vair's Wizard and the Army Chrysler's Nike Zeus, but the mission of the con-tramissile is difficult. Within 15 minutes the contramissile system must 1) detect an enemy missile--or missiles--homing in through space; 2) track, determine and lock on the precise ballistic trajectory; 3) set its own course to target; 4) blast off; 5) climb, intercept and kill at altitudes above the present minimum kill-level of 30,000 ft. And the state of the art of contra-contramissilery is ahead of the state of the art of contramissilery. Already ICBMs can theoretically fragment into hundreds of bits of metal, all hurtling through space toward target, to pose the question to the contramissile system--Which one is the warhead? The U.S.'s best prospect for continental defense is therefore an advanced and costly early-warning system, so that the U.S. can have time to launch its own offensive power before the enemy can destroy it on the ground. Earliest time estimate of a real anti-missile defense: 1965.

Tactical Missiles

The U.S. is developing about ten tactical missile systems, most of them extensions of long-range artillery. Already operational in Europe and Formosa is the Air Force's Martin Matador, a 650-m.p.h. winged guided missile that can be jammed off course or shot down if it can be spotted in time. The Navy can fire its similar Regulus I, now also operational, from the missile cruisers Macon and Toledo. It is also developing Regulus II, a more advanced guided missile that can reach an altitude of 50,000 ft. and speeds of 800 to 1,000 m.p.h.

The Army has long had an arsenal of operational shortrange, battlefield ballistic missiles similar to the old German V25 and equipped with atomic warheads. The Corporal, operational in Europe, is command-guided by radio to enemy rear concentration areas at 75-to 100-mile range. Honest John, also operational in Europe, can put an atomic warhead onto targets at closer 15-to 20-mile range, while Little John, half the size of Honest John, is a promising, highly mobile missile powered by solid charge. The Army also musters a couple of specialties: LaCrosse, a truck-launched artillery rocket for 8-to 10-mile closeup tactical support; and Dart, a stub-winged, solid-fuel rocket designed to knock out enemy tanks at two-mile range. The Army's most ambitious short-range project: The Redstone, a liquid-fuel, 200-mile ballistic missile, in production but not yet operational. And last week Defense Secretary McElroy ordered the Army to start work on a smaller, solid-fuel replacement for Redstone with 500-mile range.

Space Warfare

Space satellites have a crucial near-future military value, e.g., reconnaissance, target-location and selection, intelligence. The Air Force is developing a Lockheed space project called Big Brother or Pied Piper, a system designed to throw out one or more space satellites into orbit at a 300-mile altitude. Function: a continual survey of the world, reported by television and other means. The Air Force is also considering other multibillion-dollar space projects that are years away but must be started up soon. Among them: a project to position four reconnaissance space satellites thousands of miles up; another that involves construction of space platforms serviced by manned gliders and provisioned by Atlas freighters. The military value of these projects leads inevitably to antisatellite missiles and to wholly new phases of the deterrent concept as the world moves into space.

The Second Generation

The U.S.'s program of "first-generation" strategic missiles is operating on the Defense Department's top-of-the-budget top priority, is on or ahead of schedule. The Air Force alone is spending $3,000,000 a day on ballistic missiles, has already mobilized an organization of 16 prime contractors, 200 major subcontractors, 228,000 suppliers and vendors, and is enlisting the best available scientific help, whether civilian or military. But the Air Force's missile boss, Major General Ben Schriever, believes that the U.S. missile program "can and should" be expanded right now in terms of i) more ICBM and

IRBM base construction, 2) more training of missile crews, 3) more funds for Titan, 4) stepped-up production of the IRBM Thor. With the Rockefeller Report (TIME, Jan. 13), Schriever believes that the U.S. should be preparing more thoroughly for its biggest chance of overtaking the Russians: to set up production and modification lines so that the U.S. can churn out arsenals of missiles with the full vigor of U.S. production the moment a tested piece of "hardware" becomes operational.

Beyond these first-generation needs, the U.S. will hear much in coming weeks of the need for looking more sharply into the future and appropriating funds for the second-generation missiles of the mid-1960s. Schriever's command can produce detailed designs of second-generation liquid-fuel or more probably solid-charge missiles; the Air Force Research and Development Command believes that contracts for second-generation missiles can and should be let now. Beyond that, U.S. science and U.S. defense face the challenge not only of overtaking the Russians along established strategic and technological lines but of developing wholly new lines, in the style of the U.S.'s pioneer nuclear submarines and pioneer balloon-launched moonward rockets, in which the U.S. can get ahead and stay ahead of the U.S.S.R. Says Schriever: "We must make a start on our specific space capabilities immediately if we are to have any chance of leading in space technology in the 1965-70 prime period."

Thus goes--and must go--the U.S.'s struggle to maintain the peace and security of the free world by maintaining the deterrent power on earth and in space through the late 19503 and 19603 into the 19705. "Our real problem," the President summed up in his State of the Union address last week, "is not our strength today; it is the vital necessity of action today to ensure our strength tomorrow."

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