Cheaper Than War

Born of a mob uprising and led initially by men seemingly abashed at their own daring, the Algiers insurrection last week hardened into an organized revolution. By week's end the insurgents possessed a kind of legislature -- the 70-man All-Algeria Committee of Public Safety. They also had an executive, "united unto death"--a three-man supreme junta composed of Gaullist Jacques Soustelle, Paratroop General Jacques Massu, and slight, intense Mohammed Sid Cara, a Moslem physician who served as Secretary for Algerian Affairs in the last government.

Above all. the insurgents had a policy for ending the Algerian war--a policy so radical that no French government had ever dared to put it into effect. While Moslems and Frenchmen alike cheered him on, burly Jacques Soustelle, who escaped a police guard in Paris to fly to Algiers, called for complete political integration of 1,000,000 French and 8,700,000 Moslem Algerians. Cried Soustelle: "Let each one of us be French like all the rest, with the same rights and duties."

In Geneva, Ferhat Abbas, elder statesman of F.L.N., Algeria's Moslem independence movement, promptly denounced Soustelle's program as "a crude maneuver against Algerian nationalism." But from Algiers, TIME Correspondent Stanley Karnow reported:

The most stupefying sight in all the restive excitement that grips Algiers is the enthusiasm of the Moslems. They have come out of the fetid alleys of the casbah, descended from the hills, flocked in from the countryside around Algiers. Every evening in the vast parking lot in front of the Government General Building they join hands with Europeans in a "Friendship Chain" and sing the Marseillaise. Terrorized for almost four years by the F.L.N. on one hand and the Europeans on the other, the Moslems of Algeria--particularly in the cities--have greeted the promise of integration with immense relief. Without entirely understanding what is happening or why they are suddenly embraced as brothers, they have been carried away by the hope of equality and dignity.

Payday. When the integration movement started, it was mainly inspired and organized by the army, whose leaders recognized that associating Moslems and Frenchmen would give the insurrection a strength it could never achieve if it were based solely on exasperation with the politicians in Paris. Military trucks and buses were commandeered to bring fellahin in from their farms, and the army saw to it that Moslem demonstrators did not lose a day's pay. The Moslem stevedores from the Algiers docks had good reason to join in, too. Since maritime traffic with France had been cut off. they were not working anyway, and found it profitable to march along with everyone else.

Even more appealing than the chance to go to town and celebrate, with all expenses paid, was the name De Gaulle. Among Algerian Moslems, De Gaulle has the reputation of a liberator and a liberal. By the mere fact of talking recently with Algerian nationalist leaders, he has in Moslem eyes recognized Algerian nationalism. And to the average Algerian, who has little use for institutions and great respect for individual leaders, De Gaulle stands for power and authority in the old-fashioned tribal sense.

Palms & Paratroopers. Impressive as the present wave of Moslem enthusiasm for integration is, there are staggering difficulties involved. On a one-man, one-vote basis, Algeria's Moslems would send more than 100 Deputies to the National Assembly in Paris, and they would effectively control political power in Algeria itself. If salaries, social security and family allotments were equalized with those of Metropolitan France, it would cost millions of dollars. Who would pay, and with what?

I put these questions to Jacques Soustelle as he relaxed, from a killing schedule of speeches and political conferences, in the Villa des Oliviers. a spacious Moorish residence surrounded by palms, bougainvillaea and armed paratroopers. The number of Deputies Algeria will send to the National Assembly is a problem of secondary importance, declared Soustelle. "The real crux of the matter is that the Algerian Moslems want integration, not independence or any other formula. The events of the past two weeks have been a plebiscite."

Algeria's French colons, Soustelle thought, would also accept integration if given binding ties between Paris and Algiers. "If Algeria is separated from France," said he. "the Europeans get worried. But when Algeria becomes a really integrated part of France, the European minority knows that its rights will be protected by the government in Paris." As for the money to finance integration, Soustelle pointed to the oil and natural gas of the Sahara, then added: "Anyway, it will cost less than a war."

The Only Man. Like every other thoughtful Frenchman in Algeria. Soustelle is painfully aware that if rapid steps are not taken to fulfill the Moslems' newfound hopes for integration, the resulting bitterness is likely to be beyond appeasement. To Soustelle, the only man who can prevent this--the only man who can arbitrate between Metropolitan France and the Algiers insurgents--is Charles de Gaulle. On this conviction. Soustelle has at 46 staked his political future.

"Where will you be if De Gaulle does not make it?" I asked him. With tired, red-rimmed eyes magnified by spectacles, Soustelle looked at me in silence for a moment, then said firmly: "He will."

"But what if he does not make it?" I insisted. For the first time in our talk. Soustelle spoke French. He shrugged and said: "C'est la vie."

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